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1 Introduction and Motivation
Beliefs of agents are important ingredients in many economic models dealing with uncer-
tainties. Belief formation is studied recently in environments with limited and heteroge-
nous information, that are not suitable to be modeled in the widely used and accepted
state space framework of Savage (1954) and Bayes. Lacking a state space representation
of uncertainties an agent needs to form her belief explicitly by directly using available
information.
We axiomatize a belief formation process based on limited, differently relevant and
precise available information. Our main axiom modifies the concatenation axiom in Billot
et al. (2005)(BGSS), which precludes the impact of agents’ perceptions and reactions
to differently precise information. Their axiom says, that for any two information sets
the belief induced by their combination can be expressed as a weighted average of the
beliefs induced by each information set separately. The averaging of beliefs induced by
any arbitrary information sets requires a cognitive challenging tradeoff of identical, but
differently precise information contained in the particular information sets. Our axiom
says, that agents, that care about precision of information, can only average beliefs (in
a normatively reasonable way) induced by specific - almost disjoint - information sets.
Thereby, we focus not only on the precision itself, but also on its perception and impact
in form of cautiousness and confidence feelings.
The most prominent and often used models to describe and analyze uncertainty in eco-
nomic theory are versions of the approach of Savage and Bayes. The fundamental idea
in this approach is to model uncertainty by a grand state space, which is sufficiently rich
to describe and resolve all possible sources of uncertainties. In this way a state space
implicitly incorporates some (perfect) belief (and theorization about structures and rela-
tionships) about the future and thereby requires a large (often un-achievable) imagination
and theorization task of agents. In addition, insufficient (or too complex) information may
preclude the derivation or definition of a grand state space. Another principle of the state-
based approach is the representation of a belief as an unique probability over the grand
state space. In this framework a purely subjective probability distribution over states can
be endogenously deduced from preferences, which inherently lacks an explicit description
of the formation of the belief that generated the preference 1.
There is basically only one way to deal with these two difficulties. Sticking to the grand
state space-principle, but abandoning the subjective prior approach, would precludes an
direct (objective) assignment of probabilities, since the state space already encodes all
available information. More promising is to give up the representation of uncertainty
by a state space, when an agent is (cognitive) incapable to translate information into
(imagined and theorized) states or the information is not all encompassing as needed for
the ”correct” description of a grand state space. In many real-life situations list of pieces of
information (databases) represent our informational basis. We will replace the state space
as an information aggregation by such a database representation of (actually observed)
information (data-points or recalled cases).
A belief based on a database needs to explicitly incorporate factual objective knowledge,
1See Gilboa et al. (2012) for extensive discussion of these issues.
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characteristics and theoretical considerations provided by the present database. In general,
belief formation based on a database is very close to the goal of statistical inference. In
contrast to mainly asymptotic considerations in statistical inference, our focus (as in BGSS
and Eichberger and Guerdjikova (2010) (EG)) lies on behavioral foundations (axiomati-
zations) of a belief formation and the analysis of small databases containing differently
precise information.
Usually statistical experiments are dealing with identical observations, which are equally
relevant. However, since small or medium sized databases contain limited and heterogenous
information agents might want to take into account not only (a few) identical but also
partially relevant observations for their belief formation. In this sense - differently to
statistical experiments - relevance or similarity measures become important, when data
sets contain limited heterogenous information.
Case-based Decision Theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995, 2001)) deals with such a
framework in decision theoretic contexts. BGSS can be interpreted as an adoption of it to
belief formation 2. Their axiomatized belief describes a generalized (subjective) frequentist,
in which agents assign different similarity weights to information with different degree of
relevance. For a new problem and given a database of past observations, their belief over
possible outcomes is represented as a similarity weighted average of estimates, that are
induced by the observed cases.
Their main concatenation axiom deals with relationships between databases and their
induced belief. It requires that for a new problem x the belief P (probability vector over
outcomes for x) induced by the combination (concatenation) of any two databases (D◦E),
is a weighted average of the belief induced by each single database (D and resp. E)
separately, i.e. for all databases D and E, there exists a λ ∈ (0, 1) such that
P (x,D ◦ E) = λP (x,D) + (1− λ)P (x,E)
Our paper deals mainly with the modification of this concatenation axiom in order to
allow for impacts of precision of information and its induced cautiousness and confidence
concerns. Additionally, our precision dependent belief formation is suitable for small
databases, which is only partially possible and reasonable for BGSS.
The concatenation axiom shows some irrelevance of growing precision. The belief in-
duced by a database coincides with the belief induced by arbitrary many replications of
the same database, i.e. P (x,D) = P (x,DT ) for all T ∈ N. Growing precision might not
be a concern for sufficiently rich and large databases such that observing additional iden-
tical information will not affect her predictions. However for small database, specifically
consisting only of one piece of information c, it is unreasonable that additional observa-
tions do not induce some learning and refinement of an already ”perfect” estimation, i.e.
P (x, cT ) = P (x, c) for all T.
In this way the concatenation axiom implies that one observation carries already any-
thing, that can be inferred by arbitrary many confirming observations. Such a instanta-
neous learning in a highly objective (and perfect) way of forecasting appears to be ques-
tionable and un-intuitive. For instance consider a situation, in which an agent throws a
2Related also to Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003) and Gilboa et al. (2011) and related Gilboa (2009).
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dice once and the figure six results. A guess of the outcome of the next throw of the dice
would differ form the estimation an agent would come up after observing one million times
a six in one million throws of that dice. However roughly speaking, the concatenation
axiom requires that an agent would infer right after the first dice throw that all sides of
the dice show the figure six, without any doubt. A procedure to base the estimation on
just one observation appears to be in-cautious, hazardous (error-prone) and unrealistic and
cannot be considered as an appealing normative advice. In fact, as in controlled statistical
experiments, additional (identical) confirming observations may serve as a proxy for its
increased informativeness, precision or accuracy, which should be reflected in a dynamic
learning and refinement of the estimations.
In addition, increasing precision might affect estimations through its perception in form
of altered cautiousness (to wrongly eliminate some outcomes) with which the forecast is
made and her changed confidence in this forecast3. If information becomes more precise, an
agent’s decreased cautiousness and increased confidence might allow to specify their pre-
diction. After receiving substantial information of disconfirming evidence that makes some
outcomes negligible, agents even might want to eliminate some (not observed) outcomes.
More general, differently precise information should lead to different induced beliefs, i.e.
P (x, cT ) 6= P (x, cL) for different L, T ∈ N, which contradict the concatenation axiom and
requires a modification in order to incorporate precision and cautiousness issues.
In general, the concatenation axiom is stated for any kind of databases, but (with regard
to potentially induced different precise estimations) it is most appealing and appropriate
as a normative advice for disjoint databases. For disjoint databases, the belief induced
by the concatenated database can be quite intuitively interpreted as an average of the
beliefs induced by the single databases separately, since no pieces of information appear in
different precision in different databases and cause conflicting considerations. The average
is determined solely by a weighting of the relevances of the concatenating databases.
However, we will explain, that for unrestricted non-disjoint databases - with common,
but differently precise pieces of information - the normative appealing spirit of averaging
beliefs conflicts with a simultaneous care about precision and cautiousness in the belief
formation 4.
A first obvious modification deals with the issue, that a precision related concate-
nation axiom cannot be formulated for pure (non-disjoint) concatenating database, but
would require additional information, such that averaging occurs according to P (D ◦E) =
λP (DL) + (1− λ)P (ET ) for some appropriate L, T ∈ N (which we will specify later). For
example consider the concatenation of the easiest non-disjoint databases (c7) = (c3) ◦ (c4).
By definition, the beliefs induced by combining databases (e.g. (c3), (c4)) are based on
less precise pieces of information (and hence also their weighted average) than the beliefs
based on the combined database (e.g. (c7)). Thus, for a cautious agent, that cares about
precisions, the information contained in concatenating databases may not be sufficient for
a belief formation according to the (unmodified) concatenation axiom5.
3See Ellsberg (1961) (p.657): ”What is at issue might be called the ambiguity of this information, a quality depending
on the amount, type, reliability, and ”unanimity” of information, and giving rise to ones degree of ”confidence” in an
estimate of relative likelihoods.”
4Stating the axiom only in terms of disjoint databases does not offer sufficient structure to derive a belief formation.
5This problematic issue does not appear in the concatenation axiom of BGSS, where precision is (endogenously)
neglected and one appearance of a case captures already all information.
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However, in general there are no replications T and L, such that each single pieces
of information is captured in equal precision in all involved databases D ◦ E, DT and
EL. These differences in precision of single common cases complicate the averaging of the
beliefs. Determining the average weight cannot anymore be interpreted as normatively ap-
pealing comparison based solely on relative relevance of the particular databases. Rather,
it is a result of a cognitive challenging (impossible) interwoven tradeoff, balancing and
aggregation of different emphasis an agent assigns to single pieces of differently precise
information in the various database. Moreover, the average weight might need to reflect
also the compensation for failures of the compulsory (by the axiom) incorporation of rel-
ative more imprecise estimations (based on the same kind of information) contained in
some beliefs than in others. Therefore, a (modified) concatenation axiom allowing for all
(replicated) databases leads to the serious problem, that agents might be cognitively over-
strained by averaging beliefs based on several identical information with different precision
levels6.
As a consequence, we propose a restriction on databases to be admissible for our modi-
fied version of the concatenation axiom, such that it sustains its normative appealing spirit.
Our anchored concatenation axiom restricts databases to a specific (almost disjoint) struc-
ture consisting of only two cases, where only exactly one of these cases (the anchor) appears
in all involved databases. The main feature is, that this single common (non-disjoint an-
chor) piece of information is contained in all involved databases in equal precision. This
enables an easy averaging of beliefs without cognitively demanding compromising between
estimations induced by differently precise observations. In addition, the equal appearance
of the anchor case in all involved databases intuitively allows to ”neglect” its effect in
determining the average weights and to compare only the relative importance of the pieces
of information, that appear only in exactly one of the involved databases. This facilitates
a very straightforward way to find the average weights for the beliefs - almost in the spirit
of averaging beliefs induced by disjoint databases.
In order to take into account the precision of beliefs induced by databases, our agent
focusses on the most precise and hence reliable information in the database. Since it is
impossible to capture all information in its actual precision level perfectly in a non-disjoint
combination of databases (as explained above), our agents require to cover at least the most
precise information objectively in her belief. Consequently our axiom requires, that there
exists no distortion of the most reliable information in the process of averaging beliefs. To
achieve this, the precision of most reliable information in the concatenated database must
be conveyed by the single beliefs induced by the corresponding admissible (sufficiently
replicated) databases used for the concatenation.
Besides BGSS, the closest work to ours is the axiomatization of multi-prior beliefs in
Eichberger and Guerdjikova (2010) (EG) ”Case based belief formation under ambiguity”.
Their extension of the framework of BGSS aims to formalize two kinds of ambiguity caused
by insufficient information (vanishing ambiguity) and irrelevant information (persistent
ambiguity). The focus in their paper lies predominantly on the introduction of a multi-
prior setup for an information environment with persistent ambiguity. Whereas our work
6Alternatively, if one would stick to general non-disjoint databases, then the only way to ”unify” the differently precise
information in all involved databases is given by assuming ad hoc some arbitrary (imagined) level of precision, according
to which all cases are evaluated independent of their actual observation. This will be discussed in detail in Section 6.1.
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focuses on the analysis of precision in the sense of vanishing ambiguity (imprecision) and
related cautiousness in a single prior belief. EG’s modification of the concatenation axiom
of BGSS is adequate to specify how beliefs over outcomes change in response to additional
information and tackles also the mentioned drawback of BGSS regarding irrelevance of
growing precision of information. Different to our work, their modification reflects the idea
of ”controlling for the ambiguity ” (p.4) (precision) by restricting the involved databases to
equal length. However, as discussed above controlling for precision by equal lengths of the
involved databases is not sufficient to control for different precise information contained in
these databases. As a direct consequence, EG’s modification of the concatenation axiom
assumes (and does not prevent) that agents are (cognitively) able to aggregate and balance
information of the same kind, but in different precision. In contrast, the focus of our paper
lies exactly on the issue to avoid such cognitive challenging or even impossible tradeoffs in
the aggregation of differently precise information and to keep the spirit of a normatively
reasonable and easy averaging procedure. Moreover, in general EG’s axiom implies that
no estimation is based on objectively present information in the database, which would
require (in our context) that agents need to imagine the (true) cautiousness feeling evoked
by a precision level that is imagined as well. In contrast our approach implicitly requires
only the ability to estimate based on already experienced cautiousness and thus avoids
imaginations of unexperienced feelings of cautiousness.
In sum, adopting parts of the axiomatization of BGSS and EG, our anchored concatena-
tion axiom will allow for a structural similar belief representation as in BGSS and EG. All
three axiomatized representations differ in the way, how they treat information of different
qualities of precision. BGSS does not take into account precision at all and EG captures
the effect of (persistent) ambiguous information by a set of beliefs, which are based on
precision-dependent estimates, where the level of (imagined) precision is according to the
total amount of information contained in the entire database. In our representation the
cautiousness related estimates are based on the level of precision and cautiousness induced
by the most precise information in the database. More precisely, for a new problem and
a given database, its induced belief can be represented as a similarity-weighted average of
cautious estimates induced by past observations in the database. Thereby the similarities
and estimates are endogenously derived.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we will outline
the model and in Section 3 we develop an example to illustrate reasonable belief formations
and our leading example. Then the axioms are stated and discussed, where the central
Section 5 points out the drawbacks and necessary modification of the concatenation axiom
to incorporate precision, which eventually leads to our version of the concatenation axiom.
Section 6 presents and discusses the main representation result. Section 7 concludes the
paper. Appendix A and B contain both directions of the proof, where B.4 gives a rough
sketch of the main part of the proof. The rest of the Appendix deals with an objective
belief, the relationship to EG’s axiom and an alternative axiomatization of a very cautious
belief.
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2 The model
2.1 Cases and Databases
A basic case c = (x, r) consists of a description of the environment or problem x ∈ X and
an outcome r ∈ R, where X = X1 × X2 × .... × XN is a finite set of all characteristics
of the environment, in which Xj denotes the set of possible values features j can take. R
denotes a finite set of potential outcomes, R = {r1, ..., rm}.
The set C ⊆ X ×R consists of all m basic cases, i.e. |C| = m.
A database D is a sequence or list of basic cases c ∈ C. The set of databases D consisting
of L cases, i.e. D = ((x1, r1), ..., (xL, rL)) is denoted by C
L and the set of all databases
by C∗ = ∪L≥1CL. The description of databases as sequence of potentially identical cases
allows multiple observation of an identical case to be taken into account and treated as an
additional source of information.
For a database D ∈ C∗, fD(c) denotes the relative frequency of case c ∈ C in databases D.
We need some definitions for the framework of database.
The concatenation of two databases D = (c1, c2, ..., cL) ∈ CL and E = (c′1, c′2, ..., c′T ) ∈ CT
is denoted by D ◦ E ∈ CL+T and is defined by D ◦ E := (c1, c2, ..., cL, c′1, c′2, ..., c′T ).
In the following we will abbreviate the concatenation or replication of L-times the identical
databases D by DL. Specifically, cL represents a database consisting of L-times case c.
If a case c ∈ C appears in a database D, i.e. fD(c) > 0, we write c ∈ D.
Two databases D and E are called disjoint if for all c ∈ C: c ∈ D if and only if c 6∈ E.
2.2 Induced Beliefs
For a finite set S, ∆(S) denotes the simplex of probability vectors over S and for n ∈ N
∆n denotes the simplex over the set {1, 2, ..., n}.
An agent will form a belief over the outcomes P (x,D) ∈ ∆(R) in a certain problem char-
acterized by x ∈ X using her information captured in a database D ∈ C∗, i.e.
P : X × C∗ → ∆(R). The restriction to databases of length T is denoted by PT (x,D) ∈
∆(R) for D ∈ CT and PT : X × CT → ∆(R).
One can interpret PT (x,D) as the belief over outcomes induced by database D ∈ CT (given
environment or problem x ∈ X).
Throughout the paper the problem x is fixed, therefore x is often suppressed in the follow-
ing, i.e. P (x,D) = P (D).
3 Motivating examples
3.1 Exemplary development of a belief formation process
A doctor needs to evaluate the likelihood of potential outcomes of a specific treatment.
Let a patient be described by a vector of characteristics x ∈ X, where X might consist of
measures of characteristics like age, gender, weight, height, blood pressure, temperature,
blood count, vital signs, medical history, drug tolerability, etc.
The doctor might have observed several outcomes of the treatment in the past, which are
collected in a set R, containing e.g. feels better, worse or unchanged, measures of side
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effects like headaches, sleepy, depressive, passed out, giddy, dizzy, etc.
The doctor has acquired some working experience prescribing this treatment and/or has
access to some medical record on this treatment. Thus, she is able to base her judgement on
past experience or observations collected in a database D = (c1, ..., cT ), where in each case
ci the characteristic and the observable outcome of patient i is recorded, i.e. ci = (xi, ri),
where xi ∈ X and ri ∈ R. It means that a patient characterized by xi responded to the
treatment with outcome ri.
Given the characteristics x ∈ X of a current patient and her available information and ex-
perience in form of a database D, the doctor derives a probabilistic belief P (x,D) ∈ ∆(R)
over potential outcomes in R for this treatment. How can she do the evaluation?
a) A first intuitive approach for the prediction is, to consider only patients in the
database, which are identical (with respect to the measured characteristics) to the present
patient. Based on this sub-sample Dx := (c ∈ D|c = (x, ri) for some ri ∈ R) ⊆ D the
doctor might derive a prediction over potential outcomes via empirical frequencies:
P (x,D) =
∑
cj∈Dx δrj
|Dx| ,
where δj is the probability vector on R with mass 1 on the outcome rj ∈ R. Of course this
belief formation process is not practical, if the sub-sample Dx contains only few observa-
tions, i.e. if there are only a couple of identical (with respect to the measured characteris-
tics) patients.
b) To overcome this problem of limited or insufficiently many identical observations,
the doctor might include into her prediction procedure not only identical, but in addition
also similar patients. Suppose, that she is able to judge how similar patients are, i.e. she is
able to employ a function s : X×X → R, where s(xt, xj) measures the degree of similarity
between patients characterized by xt and xj . Her belief formation process might run in a
”subjective” frequentist way:
P (x,D) =
∑
cj∈D s(x, xj)δrj∑
cj∈D s(x, xj)
c) In addition, the doctor might infer from a case cj = (xj , rj) ∈ X×R not only a point
prediction on δrj , but a more general induced estimation P
cj 7. Basically, she attaches
also some likelihood to outcomes that are closely or reasonably related to the observed rj :
P (x,D) =
∑
c∈D s(x, xj)P
c∑
c∈D s(x, xj)
. (1)
This belief formation process is axiomatized in BGSS.
d) Furthermore, the doctor might process the past observations not in an one by one
estimation problem as in the approaches above, but might want to sample the database
7More precisely, actually P c = P (x,c) represents an estimate induced by c given the current patient x, i.e. if c is
totally unrelated to the current patient, it might be that P c is uniform on R.
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beforehand according to identical cases. Many observations of the same case might foster
some learning and improved understanding of the relationship between characteristics of a
patient and corresponding outcomes. Additional confirming observations should affect the
judgment of a cautious doctor as well by an increased confidence and decreased cautiousness
in predicting the observed outcome. In this way, the doctor might generate different
predictions depending on how many observations of this case are present in the database.
For instance, suppose there is a generally observed side-effect of many different medicines,
then the doctor might still assign a positive likelihood to this side-effect, if the doctor has
observed just a few (identical) patients not suffering from this side effect under the specific
treatment. However, if the treatment is well established and many identical patients did
not feel this side-effect, then she might not consider this side-effect as a potential hazard
anymore. This intuition can be modeled by incorporating precision into a cautious belief
formation, where the number of observation can be interpreted as a proxy for the precision
of the information:
P (x,D) =
∑
c∈D s(x, c)fD(c)P
c
TD(c)∑
c∈D s(x, c)fD(c)
,
where P cL represents the precision dependent estimation on R induced by L observation of
case c, where usually P cT 6= P cL for T 6= L. Hence TD(c) ∈ N denotes a database dependent
precision (and induced cautiousness) level, according to which a doctor will estimate the
outcomes based on observation of case c.
Interestingly, the already mentioned belief formations of BGSS and EG are special cases
of this representation:
(i) BGSS’s axiomatization implies TD(c) = ∞. Hence, their agent learns instantaneously
the ”correct” distribution P c∞ = P c induced by case c (see representation (1)).
(ii) The axiomatic derivation in EG results in TD(c) = T for D ∈ CT .
(e) A natural interpretation of TD(c) in (d) is TD(c) = fD(c)T for all c ∈ D ∈ CT :
PT (x,D) =
∑
c∈D s(x, c)fD(c)P
c
fD(c)T∑
c∈D s(x, c)fD(c)
, (2)
where fD(c)T gives the actual number of appearance of case c in database D. Such a
representation is very objective by incorporating only actually available and observed in-
formation. This representation is (unfortunately) irreconcilable (see Appendix C) with any
generalized version of a concatenation axiom (in the sense of not only combining disjoint
databases), which is an important behavioral component of a belief formation.
However, unless its appealing objective character, this belief formation might entail the
following problem. Obviously, the belief employs (in general) an aggregation of estimates
(P cfD(c)T )c∈D based on different precise single pieces of information c, which carry different
deficits in their correctness of prediction. This might over-complicate the evaluation since
the doctor might want to accompany the fact, that some of her predictions are more reliable
than others and should receive more weight independent from the similarity and frequency
weighting. In this sense, she might want to include an additional weighting scheme taking
into account the precision or reliability of the estimates 8.
8Alternatively, these considerations might be incorporated into the weights s, which prevents an desirable independent
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f) However, a doctor might not only rely on objective precisions of the estimations, but
also wants to capture her perception of its precision, i.e. the influence of how cautious and
confident she feels while estimating P cTD(c). In this vein, we prefer a different choice for
TD(c) in order to take the doctor’s cautiousness and confidence concerns into account.
The underlying intuition is that she does not change or adjust constantly her cautious-
ness and confidence attitude in response to each differently precise information. Rather,
after the doctor has experienced an (extreme) level of cautiousness and confidence by
estimating based on objectively available (unimagined) information, she might keep and
adopt it to other estimations. Basically she attained an ”appropriate” sustainable attitude
regarding her cautiousness sensation or learned how to confidently estimate sufficiently
cautious and applies it to all remaining estimations. This also overcomes the mentioned
potential disfavor of aggregating different precise estimations emerging in the objective
belief formation (2).
The most intuitive choices for a cautiousness attitude are the two extreme perceptions,
i.e. the experience of minimal and maximal cautiousness, which are induced by the most
or least precise information in the database. A minimal cautious attitude might distract
from any other more cautious perceptions, since the doctor learned how to handle infor-
mation in an appropriate cautious way. A maximal cautious agent might be intimidated
by the experienced imprecision and can not be convinced to leave her skeptical mood to
adopt a more confident attitude for estimating according to the available more accurate
information.
The following cautious belief formation captures these ideas (for a attitude of min-
imal cautiousness) and will be axiomatized in our paper:
PT (x,D) =
∑
c∈D s(x, c)fD(c)P
c
maxc fD(c)T∑
c∈D s(x, c)fD(c)
.
The above examples were intended to clarify the framework and demonstrate a meaning-
ful evolution of a belief formation taking into account subjective and precision concerns.
However, in the following we will use a reduced version as our leading example.
3.2 Leading Example
Assume that, the patients are not anymore described by a large vector of their personal
characteristics, but just according to their symptoms or diagnosed sickness. In particular,
each patient is characterized by just a single symptom and the outcome of a treatment is
only roughly distinguishable between w(orse), n(ot affected) or b(etter), i.e. R = {w, n, b}.
So basically a doctor has prescribed a certain medicine to many patients with different
symptoms or illnesses and observed the outcome of this drug, i.e. a case is described as a
pair of symptom and outcome of the treatment. For example the drug improved on the
state of patients suffering from sore throat, but was harmful for most patients suffering
from stomach problems.
interpretation in similarity terms and requires the function s to depend also on the databases directly, which will be
precluded (later) by our constant similarity axiom. In addition, it conflicts with the easy averaging intuition
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4 Axioms
In the first part we adopt modified versions of the uncritical axioms in BGSS. The second
main part discusses in detail the concatenation axiom and its drawbacks in a precision
dependent framework, which eventually leads to our new anchored concatenation axiom.
4.1 Uncritical Axioms
4.1.1 Invariance Axiom
For every T ≥ 1, every database D = (c1, ..., cT ) ∈ CT and any permutation pi on {1, ..., T}
PT ((c1, ..., cT )) = PT ((cpi(1), ..., cpi(T )))
The Invariance axiom states, that an induced belief over outcomes depends only on the
content of that database and is insensitive to the sequence or order in which data arrives.
However, the order in which information is provided or obtained can influence the
judgment strongly and may carry information by itself (e.g. see Rubinstein and Salant
(2006)). For example, first and last impressions or reference effect demonstrate the different
impacts of cases depending on their positions. One way to cope with these order effects
is to describe the cases informative enough. E.g. if one wants to capture the position or
time of occurrence of a case in a database, one could implement this information into the
description of the cases itself. Put differently, if one challenges the invariance axiom, then
there must be some criteria which distinguish the cases at different positions in a database
and paying attention explicitly to this difference in the description of the cases may lead
the agent to reconcile with the invariance assumption.
Hence, we will base our belief formation only on the content of the database D, which
allows to characterize each D by the pair of its frequency vector and length, i.e. (fD, |D|).
4.1.2 Learning Axiom
For every c ∈ C the limit of PT (cT ) exists, i.e. the sequence converges to P c∞.
In the context of precision dependent beliefs the axiom can be interpreted as a stable
learning process. For instance, an agent starts out with an initial prior (like a uniform
as in the principle of insufficient reason) that will be adjusted in the process of observing
additional information. Increasing the number of confirming observations will lead to
vanishing imprecision and cautiousness in estimating. Basically, the estimate will become
less sensitive to new additional confirming information and will eventually converge to a
limit distribution. This intuition is as in Bayesian updating, where additional (confirming)
information may render the prior beliefs more precise, but differently to Bayesian updating
the support might change here. For instance, it is reasonable to assume that finally the
agent will learn the true distribution of a case c = (x, r) ∈ C given the problem x ∈ X,
i.e. limT→∞ P (x, cT ) = δr, where δr is again the Dirac measure. However for a problem
x′ 6= x ∈ X the belief might just converge to a general uniform-like distribution on R, since
the observed case does not give relevant information for the current problem at all. Hence,
we require only that such a limit estimation exists.
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Another intuition that we mentioned already, runs as follows. T many observations a
case c = (x, r) might not make a cautious agent feel confident to reliably rule out a non-
observed outcomes completely, but she wants to assign at least some positive likelihood
to it, i.e. PT ((x, r)
T )(r′) > 0. However, observing further confirming cases might carry
sufficient evidence, such that an agent would feel confident not to make a mistake or act
incautious in excluding some outcomes, i.e. PL(x, r)
L)(r′) = 0 for L T .
Alternatively, one can apply a (accordingly adjusted) learning procedure as in Epstein
and Schneider (2007), where an agent might start out with a uniform estimation and after
observing new information keep only the most plausible estimates. Plausible estimations in
their sense are those that survive a maximum likelihood test (according to some strictness
parameter, which might correspond with a cautiousness measure in our setup) against the
belief that best explains the observations, i.e. the dirac measure on the observed outcome.
4.1.3 Diversity Axiom
There exist T ∗ ∈ N, such that for all T ≥ T ∗, no three of {PT (cT )}c∈C are collinear.
Form a technical point of view this axiom allows to derive an unique similarity function,
but it also carries an appealing intuition. Roughly it states, that sufficiently many obser-
vations induce always estimations, which are informative (or diverse) in the sense that no
combination of two other sufficiently often observed cases can deliver the same estimation.
Hence, no sufficiently precise case can be ”replaced” by sufficient observations of two other
cases in this sense. The reason to base the diversity of induced estimation on a precision
threshold T ∗ is the following. In order to derive unique similarity values one could also
require non-collinearity for every value of T, but this would exclude learning as mentioned
in the description of the learning axiom. If an agent would start out with an uniform-like
prior for databases containing few observations, it might happen that different cases induce
very similar estimations, which are likely to be collinear. The axiom just rules out, that
after a sufficient learning period any three estimations are still collinear.
4.2 Different Versions of the Concatenation Axiom
4.2.1 Concatenation Axiom of BGSS
For every database D,E ∈ C∗ there exists some λ ∈ (0, 1) such that:
P(D ◦ E) = λP (D) + (1− λ)P (E).
In the following we will call the database which emerges from concatenations of other
databases the combined or concatenated database, whereas the databases used for
the concatenation will be called combining or concatenating databases. We call the
weights λ, (1− λ) average weights.
The concatenation axiom states that the belief induced by a combined database is a
weighted average of the beliefs induced by its combining databases. It captures the idea
that a belief based on the combined database can not lie outside the interval spanned by
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the beliefs induced by each combining database separately. Intuitively it can be interpreted
in the following way (from an exclusion point of view): if the information in any database
induces an belief that does not exclude an outcome r, then the outcome r cannot be ex-
cluded by the belief induced by the combination of all these databases 9. Alternatively, if a
certain conclusion is reached given two databases, the same conclusion should be reached
given their union.
The normatively appealing spirit of the axiom is that the average weights are determined
by relative relevances or importance of the combining databases for its combination.
As already mentioned, the Concatenation axiom implies an irrelevance of growing
precision or insensitivity to additional information in the beliefs, i.e. P (D) = P (DZ)
for all D ∈ C∗ and Z ∈ N, which might be appropriate for sufficiently rich and large
databases. However, already BGSS admit, that it ”... might be unreasonable when the
entire database is very small ....” (BGSS (2005), p. 1129)10. Indeed, the axiom induces
some sort of perfect objectivity and instantaneously learning. Estimation based on one
observation c = (x, r) needs to coincide with the estimation induced by arbitrarily many
observation, which can be identified in some sense with the ”true” limiting distribution, i.e.
P (x, (x, r)) = P (x, (x, r)∞). For our leading example it would mean that a doctor would
predict after one unsuccessful treatment of a sore throat that this treatment is worthless
for (identical) patients suffering from sore throat. However, this appears very unrealistic
and un-intuitive, since a database c = (x, r) might be considered more imprecise and might
induce a more cautious belief than cT = (x.r)T for sufficiently many observations T, i.e.
P (c) 6= P (cT ).
In order to incorporate precision and cautiousness aspects into the belief formation
process, the concatenation axiom needs to be modified in various ways to maintain its
normative appeal in a modified framework.
For this purpose an immediate modification concerns the issue that an agents can not
rely on beliefs induced by the concatenating databases directly, but requires appropriately
replicated concatenating database 11, i.e.
P (D ◦ E) = λP (DT ) + (1− λ)P (EL) for appropriate T, L ∈ N (3)
The reason for that is that the information contained in non-disjoint concatenating databases
appears by definition in less precision as in their concatenation, e.g. consider c2Z = cZ ◦cZ .
However, for a cautious agent caring about precision, P (cZ)(r) > 0 does not necessarily
imply P (c2Z)(r) > 0. For example our doctor might not want to rule out a successful
treatment of a coughing agent after observing 20 or 30 unsuccessful treatments according
to her perceived cautiousness, i.e. (i.e. P (cT )(r) > 0 for T = 20, 30). However, the com-
bined information of 50 unsuccessful treatments on coughs might make her feel confident
and convinced to evaluate the treatment as useless for curing a cough without violating
her cautiousness feeling, i.e. P (c50)(r) = 0. Thus, non-disjoint concatenating databases
9Of course the axiom is stronger in the sense, that it not only requires that the probability of such an r is positive,
but it should lie between the minimal and maximal assigned probabilities induced by the combining databases.
10From this perspective, our modification can be interpreted as an extension of BGSS to derive a belief formation also
for relatively small databases, which is only partially possible and reasonable given their concatenation axiom.
11This problem emerges only if the databases are non-disjoint. However to allow only disjoint databases in the
concatenation axiom does not offer enough structure to derive a belief.
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do not carry sufficient information to capture refinements of a cautious belief implied by
the concatenated database and as stated in (3) more precise (i.e. appropriately replicated)
concatenating information is required.
Furthermore, in general there exist no replications T and L that ensure that each case
in D ◦E is captured in identical precision for unrestricted non-disjoint DT and EL 12. De-
pending on its precision the same case might induce differently cautious estimations. This
leads to the difficulties that agents need to balance the differently cautious estimations
induced by the same case appearing in different precisions in the replicated concatenating
databases. Such a compromising between estimates is necessary for all cases, that are
observed in more than one database. For instance, our doctor compares the (replicated)
databases D2 = (c41, c
6
2, c
4
3) and E
2 = (c41, c
8
2, c
2
3) (and eventually average its induced be-
liefs), where each (replicated) database contains differently many observations of harmfully
treated colds c2 (6 vs. 8), neutrally treated colds c3 (4 vs. 2) and at least the successfully
treated sore throats c1 are observed identically often (4 vs. 4) (by replicating D and E,
with the focus on unifying according to c1). Hence each induced beliefs rely on different
precision with regard to observations of cases c2 and c3. How could an objective doctor
compare and average the differently precise information incorporated in these databases?
Intuitively, the doctor should use the most precise available information contained in these
databases. Information c2 is contained in the belief induced by E
2 in a more precise fashion
than in database D2 and hence the doctor would like to rely predominately on (i.e. assign
high weight to) E2 regarding c2 (since P
c2
8 vs P
c2
6 ) and to ignore the less precise estimation
wrt. c2 in D
2. However, the opposite is true for the precision of information c3, for which
she relies predominately on D2 and ignores E2.
However, such a reasonable behavior is not admissible in any version of a concatenation
axiom, where an agent is forced to assign exactly one (non-zero) average weight to the
beliefs induced by the entire databases D2 and E2 and not many different weights to the
estimates induced by the single pieces of information contained in the databases 13. In
order to reach one ”aggregated” average weight, these single weights would need to be
balanced, traded off and aggregated somehow. In particular, since the beliefs induced by
D2 and E2 contain induced estimates, that are too imprecise and cautious in comparison
to other available ones, our doctor needs to offset and capture these imprecisions and
mistakes by adjusting the average weights accordingly. However, a determination of the
average weight as a result of difficult balancing and interwoven compromising appears to
be even in this easy example rather cognitively challenging and becomes impossible for
more complex (decompositions of) databases. Further and most importantly, it conflicts
with the normatively appealing spirit of the concatenation axiom to average beliefs by an
easy comparison of relevances of the particular underlying databases.
Our modification of the concatenation axiom will deal with this problem by restricting it
to specifically structured database such that balancing and compromising due to differently
precise information is avoided and the cognitively simple averaging intuition sustains.
12This follows from the general non-existence of solutions T, L to the system of equations resulting from fD(c)|D|T =
{0, fD◦E(c)|D ◦ E|} and fE(c)|E|L = {0, fD◦E(c)|D ◦ E|} for all c ∈ D ◦ E.
13However, this potential cognitive difficulties are not an issue in the way the concatenation axiom of BGSS processes
information, where information is additive in the sense that L observations in one database and T observations in
another is equivalent to observing T + L. Since one observation caries all information, literally only the entire amount
of appearance is important for the average weight.
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However interestingly, following the idea of a concatenation axiom that still allows for
unrestricted non-disjoint concatenating databases would eventually arrive at an (not yet
given) intuition and explanation for the modification of the concatenation axiom followed
in EG. The basic idea is that agents tackle the immense compromising considerations of
different cautious estimations by assuming or choosing a common arbitrary level of pre-
cision, according to which all cases are estimated - independent of their true objective
precision. Since objective or imagined precisions might evoke different feelings of cautious-
ness such an approach would interfere with our purpose to seriously take into account
objective precision and its related concerns. A more detailed discussion on that and on
EG’s modification can be found in the Appendix D.
4.2.2 Anchored Concatenation Axiom
The above discussion shows that a concatenation axiom for unrestricted non-disjoint con-
catenating databases might destroy the underlying normatively appealing idea of an easy
averaging, when agents care about precision and its perceptional consequences. In order
to keep the normative appealing spirit, we will restrict the involved databases to a specific
reasonable structure. These databases will contain sufficiently precise information (in the
sense of (3)) and allow an cognitively easy averaging. We have seen that an agent will
run into a difficult balancing process to determine the average weights when she is faced
with concatenating databases containing common cases. For this reason, our anchored
databases are as disjoint as possible, but still sharing a specific (exploitable) structure, to
facilitate an easy comparison (and in the end a straightforward averaging of its induced
beliefs). In particular, the anchored databases consist of only two different cases, where
all anchored databases admissible for the concatenation contain a common anchor (refer-
ence) case with identical frequency and one additional mutually different case in each of
the databases14. Besides the desire to employ databases that are almost disjoint, their
structure is also driven by the general observation, that agents can compare items easier,
if they consist of less features (here: only two) and if they contain common features in the
same fashion as a reference (here: anchor case).
Recall, that m ∈ N denotes the number of basic cases, i.e. |C| = m.
Definition 4.1
Let k ∈ [0, 1] and Tj ∈ N be s.th. kTj ∈ N for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m and let T :=
∑
j 6=i≤m Tj. Let
ci, cj ∈ C for all j 6= i ≤ m
(i) For all j 6= i ≤ m a database Dji (k, Tj) ∈ CTj defined by
Dji (k, Tj) : = (c
(1−k)Tj
j , c
kTj
i )
is called an anchored database of length Tj with non-anchor case cj (for all j 6= i)
and anchor (case) ci, which appears in the database with frequency k.
(ii) An anchored chain F ∈ CT (wrt. to case ci) is defined as a concatenation of anchored
14In some sense, one can interpret the restriction to such database by agents feeling to only being cognitively skilled
or capable to confidently compare such easily structured databases.
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databases Dji (k, Tj) ∈ CTj for all j 6= i (with common anchor case ci ∈ C), i.e.
F = ◦j 6=i≤mDji (k, Tj) = (c(1−k)T11 , ..., c(1−k)Ti−1i−1 , ckTi , c(1−k)Ti+1i+1 , ..., c(1−k)Tmm )
Note, that not all databases can be interpreted as an anchored chain, since it requires to
be a result of a concatenation of specifically structured anchored databases.
In order to illustrate the anchor-framework, we use our leading example of a doctor,
that forms a belief over the outcomes of a treatment -worse, no effect, better- {w, n, b}.
For our doctor anchored databases and chains might look as follows. Each involved (an-
chored) database consist of only two different cases (patient groups), where one of these
groups (the anchor case) needs to be observed in all involved database, e.g. patients with
a successful treatment (b) of their cough (c) might be the anchor group (i.e. c1 = (c, b)).
The other patient group observed in each database is different in all involved databases,
for instance the different non-anchor groups might be patients with a neutral treatment
(n) of their sore throats (st) (i.e. c2 = (st, n)) or stomachache problems (i.e. c3 = (s, n))
or harmful treatment (w) of patients suffering from sore throats (st) (i.e. c4 = (st, w)).
To simplify the comparison of the databases (by providing a systematical structural guide-
line) the anchored database contain the (anchor) group c1 in a specific proportion k (e.g.
k = 23) of the databases’ total length. E.g. each database consisting of two thirds of
successfully treated coughing patients and one third of patients with any other mutually
different (symptom,outcome)-pair.
• For example a anchored database consists of 20 successfully treated coughs (i.e. c201 )
and 10 neutrally treated sore throats (i.e. c102 ), which results in the anchored database
with 30 patients D21(
2
3 , 30) = (c
20
1 , c
10
2 ).
• Another database might contain 40 successfully treated coughs (i.e. c401 ) and 20
neutrally treated stomachaches (i.e. c203 ), i.e. anchored databaseD
3
1(
2
3 , 60) = (c
40
1 , c
20
2 )
with 60 patients.
• Another anchored database consist of 16 successfully and 8 harmfully treated coughs
(i.e. c161 and c
8
4), i.e. D
4
1(
2
3 , 24) = (c
16
1 , c
8
4) with 24 patients.
The corresponding anchored chain based on Dj1(
2
3 , Tj) (for j = 2, .., 4 and T2 = 30, T3 =
60, T4 = 24 and T :=
∑5
j=2 Tj = 114) reads F = ◦4j=2Dj1(23 , Tj) = (c761 , c102 , c203 c84).
However, within the anchor structure the comparison of the almost disjoint anchored
databases (Dji (k, Tj))j 6=i is still not directly straightforward, since the precision of the
anchor case ci in each of the database varies with the corresponding lengths Tj , i.e. ci
is contained in Dji (k, Tj) in the amount of kTj -in our leading example reflected by the
different numbers of successfully treated coughing patients. These difference in the pre-
cision would again cause the already extensively discussed difficulties in determining the
average weights. In order to avoid this problem and also to respond to the issue of insuf-
ficiently precise information in non-disjoint concatenating database (see equation (3) and
its derivation), we need to replicate some of the anchored database to attain a common
level of precision for the anchor case. Due to the identical structure of the databases,
enforcing a common precision for anchor case is equivalent to obtain a specific common
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length L for all involved anchored databases 15. More precisely, for an anchored chain F
of (Dji (k, Tj))j 6=i≤m a belief induced by F should rely on an average of the beliefs induced
by anchored databases (Dji (k, L))j 6=i≤m. Obviously, this enables an agent to compare eas-
ily the involved databases Dji (k, L) since their only common case -the anchor case ci -
appears in identical amounts kL in all databases. Therefore, in comparing the anchored
database (and determining the average weights) the agent can concentrate on the single
and mutually different non-anchor cases.
It remains to specify and motivate a choice for a common precision level of the anchor
case and (indirect) the common length L. We will introduce it in close relationship to our
notion of the precision of an induced belief. As already discussed in general for non-disjoint
databases in the last section (see discussion after equation (3)), there exists no replication
for anchored concatenating databases, such that all single cases appear in equally precision
in (Dji (k, L))j 6=i≤m and in the related anchored chain F = ◦j 6=i≤mDji (K,Tj) 16. Obviously,
this leaves the freedom to choose a specific piece of information, that should be captured in
equal precision in all involved induced beliefs. A very intuitive (and from our point of view
most reasonable) choice to control for precision (and related confidence and cautiousness) is
to ensure that the most precise and hence reliable piece of information in the anchored chain
is captured in the identical precision in the beliefs induced by the corresponding replicated
combining databases 17. The focus and reliance on the most precise case can be justified
by interpreting it as the driving factor of the precision of the belief. Focussing on another,
less precise information would imply a less precise belief, since the most precise information
would not be captured objectively anymore (in all involved databases) 18. Hence it appears
reasonable to require, that at least the most reliable information is incorporated in the belief
without any distortions, which requires that it is also contained unbiased its generating
(averaging) beliefs.
More technically, this can be achieved by requiring a particular adjusted length of the
combining anchored databases, which is given in the following definition.
Definition 4.2
Let F ∈ CT be an anchored chain of (Dji (k, Tj))j 6=i≤m.
A length L ∈ N is called the adjusted (maximal) length and denoted by L(k, (Tj)j 6=i≤m)
if it is such that the number of observations of the most frequent case in an anchored chain
F ∈ CT is identical to the number of observations of the most frequent case in the anchored
databases Dji (k, L) (for all j 6= i), (i.e. maxc∈C fF (c)T = maxc∈C fDji (k,L)(c)L)
19.
Our leading example will clarify the relationships and intuition of the adjusted length.
Example:
(i) Our doctor considers the records of different patient groups collected in two studies, i.e.
15This seem to be close to the EG approach in fixing the lengths of the databases. However here it is a consequence of
fixing a common precision for a single case. The two approaches use different incompatible restrictions on the databases
involved in the modifications of the concatenation axioms.
16This is due to the different appearances of the cases, i.e. for the anchored chain the appearance of an non-anchor
case cj is (1 − k)Tj (for all j 6= i ≤ m) in contrast to (1 − k)L in the (replicated) anchored databases Dji (K,Tj) and
similar for the anchor case ci, there exists the difference between kT = k
∑
j 6=i≤m Tj and kL.
17Another reasonable choice is the minimal precise information, that a very cautious agent might adopt (see App. E).
18Section 6.1 discusses another interpretation in terms of an induced persistent cautiousness attitude, that is evoked
by the most precise information in the database and serves as basis for all other estimations.
19In Appendix E the maximum is replaced by a minimum to focus on minimal precise information.
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D21(
2
3 , 30) = (c
20
1 , c
10
2 ) and D
3
1(
2
3 , 60) = (c
40
1 , c
20
2 ) with common patient group c1. Patient
group c1 is also the most precise information (with 60 observations) in the correspond-
ing anchored chain F = (c601 , c
10
2 , c
20
3 ) ∈ C90. Thus the doctor requires it be matched
equally precise in appropriate replications (of the study results) of the anchored databases
D21(
2
3 , 30) and D
3
1(
2
3 , 60). The adjusted length L such that for j = 2, 3
60 = max
c∈F
fF (c)90 = max
c∈Dj1
f
Dj1
(c)L = max{2
3
,
1
3
}L = 2
3
L,
is given by L = 90, i.e. D21(
2
3 , 90) = (c
60
1 , c
30
2 ) and D
3
1(
2
3 , 90) = (c
60
1 , c
30
2 ). Obviously, the
most precise case c1 is capture in identical precision (60) in all three databases F,D
2
1(
2
3 , 90)
and D31(
2
3 , 90). This allows an easy averaging of beliefs induced by D
j
1(
2
3 , 90).
(ii) Similarly, let there be two public studies of the treatment for some specific patient
groups summarized in the following anchored chain
F = (c301 , c
40
2 , c
80
3 ) = (c
10
1 , c
40
2 ) ◦ (c201 , c803 ) = D21(
1
5
, 50) ◦D31(
1
5
, 100),
where again the anchor patient group is ”successfully treated coughs” c1. The most precise
case in F is c3 (with 80 observations), implying that an adjusted length L = 100 is deter-
mined by 80 = max{15 , 45}L. Again, the most precise case c3 is capture in identical precision
(80) in the relevant databases F and D21(
1
5 , 100) = (c
20
1 , c
80
3 ), D
3
1(
1
5 , 100) = (c
20
1 , c
80
2 ).
With these definitions at hand we can state our anchored Concatenation Axiom, where a
modified version focussing on minimal precise information can be found in Appendix E.
Recall, the length T of a database in an induced belief P becomes visible via the restriction
to PT . In particular for anchored databases D
j
i (k, Tj), we can skip the length Tj in the
induced belief..
Maximal Anchored Concatenation Axiom:
(i) Let F ∈ CT be an anchored chain of (Dji (k, Tj))j 6=i≤m, i.e. F = ◦mj 6=iDji (k, Tj) and
let L ∈ N be the corresponding adjusted (maximal) length, i.e. L = L(k, (T ji )j 6=i), then
there exists λ ∈ ∆m (where λj = 0 for all j ≤ m s. th. Tj = 0), such that
PT (F ) =
∑
j 6=i≤m
λjPL(D
j
i (k))
(ii) Let for three distinct i, j, l ≤ m and any V,W ∈ N: Dji (1, V ) = (cVi ) ∈ CV and
Dlj(1/2, 2W ) = (c
W
j , c
W
l ) ∈ C2W . Let F = Dji (1, V ) ◦ Dlj(1/2, 2W ), then there exist
λ ∈ int(∆2):
PV+2W (F ) = λPmax{V,W}(D
j
i (1)) + (1− λ)Pmax{2V,2W}(Dlj(1/2)).
Part (i) states that the belief induced by an anchored chain is a weighted average of
the beliefs induced by the related (replicated) anchored databases. The very similar and
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almost disjoint databases allow a simple averaging, which keeps the normative appealing
spirit of the concatenation axiom. The databases share only one identical precise piece
of information (the anchor case in kL-many observations)). Hence its induced identical
estimate is contained in all their induced beliefs. This allows to ”neglect” its impact for
the determination of the average weights. Since in addition, the mutually different non-
anchor cases appear only in one of the anchored databases, there emerge no difficulties in
(cognitively challenging (interwoven)) balancing of differently cautious estimations based
on identical, but differently precise observations in various databases. Thus, the anchored-
agent can basically determine the average weights based on judging the relative importance
and relevance of the mutual different non-anchor cases 20. In this way, an anchored agent
can find the average weights in a very simple case by case comparison.
The particular (maximal adjusted, Def. 4.2) length of the related corresponding con-
catenating databases ensures that the most precise case in an anchored chain is captured
objectively in the average of their induced beliefs. An anchored-agent does not accept
an average of beliefs induced by databases that evoke less precise estimations regarding
this information, since this would directly imply a distortion of the precision of the belief
induced by the anchored chain.
We continue the Examples to illustrate the anchored Concatenation axiom.
(i) cdt. The belief induced by F = (c601 , c
10
2 , c
20
3 ) is an average of the beliefs induced by
D21(
2
3 , 90) = (c
60
1 , c
30
2 ) and D
3
1(
2
3 , 90) = (c
60
1 , c
30
2 ). Since by construction the estimate based
on the anchor case c1 is identically contained in all beliefs, the doctor can neglect its in-
fluence of the anchor case for determining the average weight. Hence the weights can be
easily determined by just comparing the relative (a frequency-weighted) importance of c302
and c303 for evaluating the remaining parts of the anchored chain (c
10
2 , c
20
3 ). Intuitively,
the discrepancies in the precisions for c2 and c3 are negligible, since the focus lies pre-
dominantly on capturing perfectly the impact of the most precise case c1. This is directly
achieved in this example, since the most precise case c1 is also the anchor case, and hence
appears equally often in all databases.
(ii) cdt. The belief induced by F = (c301 , c
40
2 , c
80
3 ) is an average of the beliefs induced by
D21(
1
5 , 100) = (c
20
1 , c
80
2 ) and D
3
1(
1
5 , 100) = (c
20
1 , c
80
3 ). Again, the anchor case c1 appears
equally in both replicated anchored databases, i.e. c201 , which enables to neglect it for
finding the average weight. The agent only needs to weight the amount and relevance of
c802 and c
80
3 for judging (c
40
2 , c
80
3 ). Thereby it is essential that the most precise case (in the
anchored chain F) c3 is captured perfectly. The discrepancies in the objective precisions
for the cases c1 (20 in D
j
1 vs 30 in F) and c2 (D
j
1 are negligible, since the focus lies on
capturing the most precise information c3 objectively.
A straightforward consequence of the agent’s focus on the most precise case and the spe-
cific structure of the anchored databases is that the estimations based on minor precise
pieces of information are not made in their objective precision, but in the precision of the
most precise case. This can be seen directly by the recursive application of the anchored
concatenation axiom, i.e. PT (D) =
∑
c∈D λcP
c
maxc fD(c)·T for appropriate λc.
20Of course, the estimation based on the anchor case is not contained in the same weight in each belief, but this is
directly adjusted for by assigning the desired weights to the beliefs induced by the particular databases.
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Since this structure (obviously) reappears in our representation theorem, we will postpone
the discussion of its plausibility and reasonability to Section 5.1.
Part (ii) of the anchored Concatenation Axiom describes just a restriction to the very
intuitive requirement that a belief induced by a combination of two disjoint databases
should lie in between the induced beliefs of the disjoint databases separately. Averaging
beliefs based on disjoint database are at the heart of the axiom, since there are no in-
terdependencies between the information (and their precision) in the different databases.
Furthermore, the axiom requires averaging only for very specific databases, i.e. a database
consisting only of observations of one case and a database containing (potentially differ-
ent, but) equally many observations of two other cases. The main assumption concerns the
condition on the lengths, which is again driven by the agent’s focus on the most precise
cases, in the sense that the most precise information should be captured equally in all
averaging beliefs induced by the respective databases.
4.3 Constant Similarity Axiom (for maximal anchored version)
(i) Let F ∈ CT be an anchored chain of (Dji (k, Tj))j 6=i≤m, i.e. F = ◦mj 6=iDji (k, Tj) and let
L ∈ N be the corresponding adjusted (maximal) length, i.e. L = L(k, (T ji )j 6=i).
If there exist some vector λ ∈ ∆m, (where λj = 0 for all j ≤ m such that Tj = 0) such
that for some Z ∈ N the following equation holds:
PZT (F
Z) =
m∑
j 6=i
λjPLZ(D
j
i (k)),
then this equation holds for all Z ∈ N.
(ii) Let for three distinct i, j, l ≤ m and any V,W ∈ N F = Dji (1, V ) ◦ Dlj(1/2, 2W ). If
there exist λ ∈ int(∆2) for some Z ∈ N such that the following equation holds:
PZ(V+2W )(F
Z) = λPZmax{V,W}(D
j
i (1)) + (1− λ)PZmax{2V,2W}(Dlj(1/2)),
then this equation holds for all Z ∈ N.
The average weights λs are related to (frequency weighted) relevance or similarity weights,
which could in principle depend on the length of the database. However, the Constant
similarity axioms allows to identify the similarity function independent of the content and
the size of the databases. To require a length-independent similarity is reasonable, if the
similarity values are determined by some primitive or prior knowledge about the environ-
ment, which can not be learned, influenced or based on the information contained in the
database. Of course, the axiom is questionable, if an agent uses the databases not solely
for evaluation of the outcome distribution, but also to learn something about structural
(causal) relationship of particular features in the cases. However, the approach taken in
this work excludes such deductive reasoning in deriving and updating the similarities from
underlying databases 21.
21For deductive reasoning see also the section about the relationship to statistical methods in Section 5.4
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5 Representation Theorem
5.1 Representation with maximal anchored Concatenation Axiom
Theorem 5.1
Let there be given a function P : C∗ → ∆(R). Let PT be the restriction of P to CT for
T ∈ N. Let P satisfies the Learning Axiom and the Diversity Axiom.
Then the following are equivalent:
(i) The function P satisfies the Invariance axiom, the maximal anchored Concatenation
axiom, the Constant Similarity axiom
(ii) There exists for each (T, c) ∈ N× C a unique P cT ∈ ∆(R), and a unique -up to multi-
plication by a positive number- function s : C → R+, s. th. for all T and any D ∈ CT :
PT (D) =
∑
c∈D s(c)fD(c)P
c
T ∗D∑
c∈D s(c)fD(c)
(4)
where T ∗D ∈ N+ is defined by T ∗D := T ·maxc∈D fD(c).
A sketch of the crucial parts of the proof can be found in Appendix B4.
The induced belief is a frequency and similarity weighted average of the estimations based
on past observations. All estimations (P cmaxc fD(c)T )c∈D are made according to the level of
cautiousness implied by the most precise case. That means, that only the most precise
piece of information is captured objectively in its estimation. Hence, the axiomatized belief
formation process does not achieve a perfectly objective representation (as mentioned in
(2)) without any imagination effort. However such a ”perfect imagination-free representa-
tion ” is impossible for a sufficiently rich concatenation axiom (see Appendix E) and also
carries some drawbacks (see the discussion after (2)). In any case, we are not concerned
with imagining additional information to take into account objective precision.
In fact, in first place we are interested in capturing the perception of precision in form
of the induced psychological effects on cautiousness and confidence. This is essential for
small database containing relatively few information and is manifested in the way how
estimations P cT ∗D
are made. From this perspective, the seemingly undesirable imagination
in the axiomatized belief delivers the following intuitive and reasonable interpretation.
The underlying intuition is, that an agent does not adjust constantly her cautiousness and
confidence attitude in response to each differently precise information she encounters in a
database. Rather, once an agent has experienced a (extreme) cautiousness and confidence
feelings while estimating based on objectively available information, she keeps, adopts and
transmits her developed feeling to other estimation situations. A fixed level of cautious-
ness according to which all estimates are made can be interpreted as an gained attitude
regarding cautiousness or as a learned skill or ability to confidently estimate sufficiently
cautiously. In this way, it is a sustainable reference or state of mind, which does not vanish
and change for each new estimation.
For instance, an agent gained a feeling of cautiousness in the spirit of eliminating un-
reasonable estimates. Suppose she feels confident and considers herself cautious enough
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to assign only a small probability  to non observed outcomes r˜ 6= r in estimating based
on c = (x, r)L. Separately, her estimation induced by c′ = (x′, r′)T with T > L assigns a
slightly lower likelihood ′ <  to the not observed outcome r˜ 6= r′ according to her lower
cautiousness and higher confidence. Assume now, that in the past she has only estimated
according to a precision level lower than L and someone tells her, that T − L pieces of
information c were lost and she should better estimate according to T many imagined
observations. Without having experienced estimating according to higher precision T (i.e.
how far she can narrow down the estimation) and being unable to imagine how she would
feel if this information would be objective, she might stick to her already made estimation
based on objective information cL. However, if the agent would have estimated based on
case (c′)T in the past, then she has experienced her feeling of estimating according to the
objective precision in (c′)T and might adopt and apply the ”learned” procedure how to
eliminate and assign the likelihoods confidently for cT without concerns about being too
in-cautious.
The most intuitive choices for adopting a specific attitude towards cautiousness are the
two extreme situations, i.e. the least and most cautious (and confident) experiences. The
most precise case might come directly to her mind, because it has been observed most
frequently in the database and induces an attitude of (least) cautiousness (and highest
confidence) that is the basis for all estimation. In some sense the most confident and
least cautious feeling outshines and distracts from any other more cautious perceptions.
In contrast, the least precise information might intimidate or scare an agent and leaves a
very cautious impression. She cannot be persuaded to leave her skeptical mood for a less
cautious attitude that might be more appropriate for the remaining more accurate infor-
mation. In our representation we focus on the optimistic view, i.e. our agent estimates
according to the confidence and cautiousness gained and experienced by estimating the
most precise information in the database.
In this way it is reasonable and natural to interpret the imagination of additional informa-
tion in the sense of estimating according to an experienced cautiousness level or as gained
skill to estimate cautiously 22.
Differences in imagined information and its imagined perception
In fact, the imagination of further additional information or more precise cases is not
the cognitive difficult or challenging part in estimating based on imagined information.
Think about our doctor, who just needs to imagine that the same patient enters her office
again and shows the same outcome after being treated identically. Hence, the difficult
part is to imagine the ”correct” feeling, which would be induced by objective precision,
but which is actually only existing in imagined precision. Put differently, usually the im-
plied perception of imagined (non existing) precision differs from the perception based on
objective precision. The beliefs (EG and ours) require that agents are able to ignore this
difference, which might be fine if agents have experienced already a situation in which
they actually estimated according to that objective precision and know her induced per-
ception of that precision (as in our work). However, if an agent has never experienced
22From that perspective, our representation is even more convincing than the perfectly objective imagination-free
representation (2), in which the cautiousness and confidence is altered for each case, putting the agent in different moods
of cautiousness and confidence for each piece of information.
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such a situation before, the requirement to imagine her feeling ”correctly” (i.e. ignore the
differences is cognitively challenging and psychologically confusing and can be interpreted
as intentionally lying to yourself, without noticing. Does our doctor judge the treatment
less cautiously after adding an imagined patient to her record?
5.2 Comparison to related belief representations
The initial motivation of EG and our paper is to modify the Concatenation axiom of BGSS
to capture variations in the precision of data. A related and implied issue concerns the
way how an agent is capable to deal with the problem of combining beliefs that might be
based on identical, but different precise information and thus contain induced differently
cautious estimates.
BGSS, EG and our work share the property that eventually the estimations involved in
the final representation of a belief are subject to an unique level of precision 23. By that,
technically speaking the aggregation of different precise information is eventually not an
issue. However, from an interpretational perspective, there are important differences in
the motivation and reasonability of the corresponding concatenation axioms.
Consider for example the database D = (c31, c
4
2, c
2
3) for which a purely objective agent
forms a belief according to P (D) ∈ conv({P (c31), P (c42), P (c23)}). In BGSS, the induced
belief is given by P (D) ∈ conv({P (c1), P (c2), P (c3)}), which neglects precision and cau-
tiousness completely. EG offers a belief P (D) ∈ conv({P (c91), P (c92), P (c93)}), where no
involved estimation is made according to its objective precision. Besides the (unproblem-
atic) imagination of additional pieces of observation for all cases, the main problematic
point is the imagination on how this imagined precision is perceived, since the estima-
tion is based on a never (not yet) experienced cautiousness level 9 (see also the discus-
sion above). In our paper, the belief would be based on the most precise information,
i.e. P (D) ∈ conv({P (c41), P (c42), P (c43)}), which also would require some (unproblematic)
imagination of additional observations with respect to objective precision. However, the
perception of this precision needs not to be imagined, since the agent estimates according
to an already experienced precision and cautiousness level 4 (experienced for c2).
Arad and Gayer (2012) analyze beliefs based on datasets containing imprecise pieces of
information in the sense that ”it is not entirely clear what occurred in them ”. Roughly
speaking, their approach models this sort of imprecision (ambiguity) by assuming subjec-
tive capacities. The rough relationship to the approaches discussed above is that these
capacities would play the role of the probabilistic estimations occurring in the axiomatized
representations of BGSS, EG and ours.
5.3 Remarks on the similarity function
One could be tempted to perceive and interpret the belief formation approaches as a trans-
lation of the question from which probability to assign to which similarity to employ. This
is not completely misleading since the axiomatizations do not provide help in choosing
the similarity function. This problem occurs in a similar spirit for the choice of a prior
in the Bayesian approach. In the axiomatizations the similarity function is derived from
23in BGSS: P c∞ for all D ∈ C∗, in EG: P cT for all D ∈ CT and here PmaxcfD(c)T for all D ∈ CT .
23
presumably observable probability assignments given various databases. Fortunately, the
similarity values need not satisfy any particular properties (even no symmetry) and hence
can be derived also objectively or empirically. For example, Gilboa et al. (2006) estimate
an empirical similarity function from the data by asking which similarity function best
explains the observed data in a similarity-weighted frequency formula. Billot et al. (2004)
axiomatized an exponential similarity function. Moreover, assigning similarities appears to
be cognitively easier than stating explicit probabilities and many models in the psychology
and computer-science literature deal with determination of similarity measures (e.g. Tver-
sky (1977), Schank (1986), Heit, Heit and Rubinstein (1994), Goldstone and Son (2005)).
5.4 Remarks on relationship to statistical methods
In the introduction we mentioned already the relationship between the axiomatic ap-
proaches to belief formation in the data-based information structure and statistical ap-
proaches like inferences. In this section we want to discuss shortly similarities and differ-
ences to existing statistical methods. Obviously, the versions of the concatenation axioms
and the derived representations satisfies the following special cases of frequentism. For
s(xi, xt) = 1, our belief formation coincides with the simple average or frequentist ap-
proach, if we identify with P c a Dirac measure on the actually observed outcome. However,
the conditional frequentist cannot be covered since the corresponding s(xi, xt) = 1{xt=xi}
is not strictly positive (as required), but Bleile (2014) offers a modification that captures
it. Gilboa et al (2010, 2011) and EG show the compatibility with other statistical meth-
ods, like kernel estimation and classification (e.g. assign x to either class a or b: define
s(a, (xc, ac)) = k(xc, x)1{a=ac} using a kernel function k). As discussed in more detail in
Gilboa et al. (2010) p. 16f, the framework can be also employed in contexts, where the
observations (e.g. cases) and the prediction (e.g. possible theories) are structurally dis-
joint. For instance ranking theories by log likelihood methods s(t, c) = log(p(c|t)) is also
possible where t represent a theory and p(c|t) denotes the conditional likelihood of case c
if theory t is true.
However, the main difference to statistical inference is that the axiomatic approaches
are concerned with inductive reasoning and do not allow for deductive reasoning, which is
the issue of traditional statistical regression approaches. Let there be a database consisting
of observation D = ((xi, ri)i≤n) and a new problem xt. A regression approach would try
to learn the (empirical) similarity weights (s(xi, xt))i that best explains the database by
best fitting an estimate of rj for all j ≤ n and rsj =
∑
i6=j s(xi,xj)ri∑
i s(xi,xj)
(see also Gilboa et al.
(2006)). Hence in a statistical regression context the weights s are deduced endogenously
via the observed data and are updated with new observation, i.e. the weights would be
database dependent. Put differently, linear regression analysis (and empirical similarities)
use deductive reasoning to derive the weights and then apply them inductively to infer
the prediction. In contrast, the constant similarity (and the concatenation) axiom requires
that the weights are fixed and database independent, i.e. there is no updating or learning
of the weights.
However, the axiomatization of a belief formation (in close relationship to statistical
methods) is still meaning- and insightful, since it allows to inspect, how plausible, con-
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sistent and sensible (in the sense of normative appealing axioms) asymptotic statistical
methods are also for small database and its implied precision related concerns. From this
perspective, axiomatizations suitable for small databases (as done here) play an important
role in order to find a sound foundation of statistical methods in non-asymptotic contexts.
6 Conclusion
The paper deals with the question how agents form beliefs explicitly in an environment with
limited, heterogenous and differently precise information that cannot be condensed into a
widely used (perfect) state space a la Savage. We axiomatize a belief formation that can be
interpreted as a generalized subjective frequentist approach that incorporates subjective
perceptions regarding the relevance and precision of the information in the database. We
identify increasing precision of information by additionally observed pieces of confirming
information.
Our work is based on the axiomatization of a belief in BGSS that neglects the potential
impacts of differently precise information. Thereby, their belief formation is most suitable
for sufficiently large databases and less reasonable for small databases, which are captured
by our approach. Their belief formation implies that an agent is able to perfectly learn
from observations in a very objective and instantaneously way, without displaying any
sense of cautiousness and concerns about being potentially mistaken. Our axiomatized
cautious belief focusses on precision related cautiousness and confidence in the predictions.
The different versions of the main concatenation axiom in the approaches of BGSS, EG
and ours describe the relationships between databases and their induced beliefs.
In the context of caring for precisions in a cautious belief formation an agent following
the concatenation axiom of BGSS and EG’s version would be faced by immense cognitive
problems to handle and compare differently precise pieces of information contained in
different databases. Our modification and restriction of the axiom takes into account
these precision related cognitive problems in describing the relationships. This is achieved
by requiring that agents only need to be capable to determine the relationship between
databases and their induced beliefs for specifically structured (almost disjoint) databases
that allow an cognitively easy comparison (without precision and cautiousness concerns).
Moreover, it states that an agent controls for precision and its perceptional impacts in a
cautious belief by capturing the most precise (and hence reliable) information objectively
in its induced belief.
The resulting cautious belief is a weighted sum of cautious estimates induced by past
observed information. The weights are determined by frequencies of the observed cases
and their similarities with the problem under consideration. The induced estimates depend
on a cautiousness level implied by the most precise case, which can be interpreted as the
appropriate (gained) attitude regarding cautiousness in this database.
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A Proof of Theorem 6.1: Necessity part, i.e. (ii) ⇒ (i)
We need to show that the representation (4) satisfies the axioms, where the Invariance
axiom is obviously met.
For the Maximal Anchored Concatenation axiom, part (i),
let D ∈ CT be a chain of Dji (k, Tj) = (c(1−k)Tjj , ckTji ) for all j 6= i ≤ |C| and T :=
∑
j 6=i Tj ,
i.e.
D = ◦j 6=iDi = (c(1−k)T11 , c(1−k)T22 , ..., c(1−k)Ti−1i−1 , ckTi , c(1−k)Ti+1i+1 , ....., c
(1−k)T|C|
|C| ).
Let L = L(k, (Tj)j 6=i) be the corresponding adjusted length. Hence, we have
fD = (
(1−k)T1
T ,
(1−k)T2
T , ....,
(1−k)Ti−1
T , k,
(1−k)Ti+1
T , ...,
(1−k)T|C|
T )
t and
f
Dji (k,ZTj)
= (0, ..., 0, (1− k), 0, .., 0, k, 0, ..., 0)t.
Observe that f
Dji (k,Tj)
= f
Dji (k,ZTj)
and hence we will abbreviate f
Dji (k,ZTj)
by f
Dji (k)
.
We get:
PT (D) =
∑
c∈C s(c)fD(c)P
c
maxc∈D fD(c)·T∑
c∈C s(c)fD(c)
=
1∑
c∈C s(c)fD(c)
·
(∑
j 6=i
s(cj)
(1− k)Tj
T
P
cj
maxc∈D fD(c)·T + s(ci)
∑
j 6=i kTj
T
P cimaxc∈C fD(c)·T
)
=
1∑
c∈C s(c)fD(c)
·
(∑
j 6=i
[
s(cj)
(1− k)Tj
T
P
cj
maxc∈C fD(c)·T + s(ci)
kTj
T
P cimaxc∈C fD(c)·T
])
=
1∑
c∈C s(c)fD(c)
·
(∑
j 6=i
Tj
T
∑
c∈C
s(c)f
Dji (k)
(c)P cmaxc∈C fD(c)·T
[∑
c∈C s(c)fDji (k)(c)∑
c∈C s(c)fDji (k)(c)
])
To proceed, we need to specify maxc∈C fD(c) · T , which is by definition of the adjusted
length L exactly equal to maxc∈C fDji (c)L, hence:
PT (D) =
1∑
c∈C s(c)fD(c)
·
(∑
j 6=i
Tj
T
∑
c∈C
s(c)f
Dji (k)
(c)
∑
c∈C s(c)fDji (k)(c)P
c
maxc∈C f
D
j
i
(c)L∑
c∈C s(c)fDji (k)
)
(∗)
=
1∑
j 6=i
Tj
T
∑
c∈C s(c)fDji (k)(c)
·
(∑
j 6=i
Tj
T
∑
c∈C
s(c)f
Dji (k)
(c)PL(D
j
i (k, L))
)
=
∑
j 6=i
λjPL(D
j
i (k, L))
where we used
∑
c∈C s(c)fD(c) =
∑
j 6=i
Tj
T
∑
c∈C s(c)fDji (k)(c) in (∗).
From the last equation we get for all j 6= i ≤ |C|
λj =
Tj
T
∑
c∈C s(c)fDji (k)(c)∑
j 6=i
Tj
T
∑
c∈C s(c)fDji (k)(c)
(5)
Hence the first part of the anchored concatenation axiom is satisfied.
For the Maximal Anchored Concatenation axiom, part (ii):
let w.l.o.g. Dji (1, T ) = D
2
1(1, T ) = (c
T
1 ) ∈ CT and Dlj(1/2, 2W ) = D32(1/2, 2W ) =
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(cW2 , c
W
3 ) ∈ C2W , then we need to show:
PT+2W (D
2
1(1, T ) ◦D32(1/2, 2W )) = λPmax{T,W}(D21(1,max{T,W}))
+ (1− λ)Pmax{2T,2W}(D32(1/2, 2 max{T, L}))
We have Pmax{T,W}(D21(1,max{T,W}) = P c1max{T,W}
Since P satisfies the maximal anchored concatenation axiom part (i) we have for
D32(1/2, 2 max{T,W}) = D21(0,max{T,W})◦D31(0,max{T,W}) = (c2)max{T,W}◦(c3)max{T,W}
with the adjusted length L such that 122 max{T,W} = L, i.e. L(0,max{T,W},max{T,W}) =
max{T,W}, that there exist some λ ∈ (0, 1) such that
Pmax{2T,2W}(D32(1/2, 2 max{T,W})) = λP c2max{T,W} + (1− λ)P c3max{T,W}
Hence, using this, we get for the maximal anchored concatenation axiom (ii) the following
representation for some λ ∈ ∆3:
PT+2W (D
2
1(1, T ) ◦D32(1/2, 2W )) =
3∑
i=1
λiP
ci
max{T,W}
But this is obviously satisfied by the representation (4) in the Theorem 5.1, since for the
frequency vector fD21(1,T )◦D32(1/2,2W ) = (
T
T+2W ,
W
T+2W ,
W
T+2W , 0, ...., 0)
t, we have
maxc∈C fD21(1,T )◦D32(1/2,2L)(c)(T + 2W ) = max{T,W}, and hence
PT+2W (D
2
1(1, T ) ◦D32(1/2, 2W )) =
∑3
i=1 s(ci)fD21(1,T )◦D32(1/2,2W )
(i)P
ci
max{T,W}∑3
i=1 s(ci)fD21(1,T )◦D32(1/2,2W )
(ci)
, i.e. for i = 1, 2, 3
λi =
s(c1)fD21(1,T )◦D32(1/2,2W )(ci)P
c1
max{T,W}∑3
i=1 s(ci)fD21(1,T )◦D32(1/2,2W )(ci)
(6)
Hence the (ii)-part of the maximal anchored concatenation axiom is also satisfied.
The Constant similarity axiom is also satisfied, which can be shown by adopting
the above proof for the concatenation axiom.
Replacing D = ◦|C|j 6=iDji (k, Tj), where
∑|C|
j 6=i Tj = T by D
Z = ◦|C|j 6=iDji (k, ZTj) in the proof of
the maximal anchored concatenation axiom part (i) and transform equation (5), we get
λZj =
ZTj
ZT
∑
c∈C s(c)fDji (k,ZTj)(c)∑
j 6=i
ZTj
ZT
∑
c∈C s(c)fDji (k,ZT )(c)
= λj ,
where in the last equation f
Dji (k,ZT )
(c) = f
Dji (k)
(c) is used.
For part (ii), analogous reasoning using equation (6) yields the desired result.
Therefore the similarity axiom is satisfied, which completes the proof of the Theorem
5.1 direction (ii) implies (i).

Now we will focus on the the direction (i) implies (ii).
B Proof of Theorem 1: Sufficiency part, i.e. (i) ⇒ (ii)
The proof will exploit the fact that by the invariance axiom it is possible to rewrite the
database framework into a frequency framework. This allows to work on simplex instead
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with lists of cases or databases. In the following, we need to translate the database structure
to a frequency terminology.
B.1 Translation into frequency framework
By the Invariance axiom each database D ∈ CT can be identified by a pair (fD, T ), where
fD ∈ ∆(C) represents a frequency vector of appearances of cases in the database D and T
is the length of the database.
Note, that in the frequency setup, without knowing the corresponding database D to
which a frequency vector f ∈ ∆(C) (should) belong (in the sense of representing this spe-
cific database D), the frequency vector can be linked to infinitely many databases DZ for
all Z ∈ N+. Hence one needs to link frequency and the length of the database.
The following set represents all frequency vectors corresponding to databases D ∈ CT :
∆T (C) : = {f ∈ ∆(C) ∩QC , f(i) = li
T
, li ∈ N+,
|C|∑
i=1
li = T and
∃D ∈ CT such that fD(i) = f(i) = li/T}
Observe that if f ∈ ∆T (C), then f ∈ ∆TZ(C) for all Z ∈ N+.
Since the set of cases C is fixed, we reduce the notational effort and will abbreviate ∆T (C)
by ∆T , i.e. ∆T denotes the set of all frequency vectors representing databases of length T
and the set of all rational frequency vectors on C is denoted by ∆.
Hence by the Invariance axiom each D ∈ CT can be represented by a f ∈ ∆T , where
again f(i) := fD(ci) denotes the frequency of case ci for all i ≤ |C|.
Definition of the belief on frequencies:
From now on we consider only probabilities P ∈ ∆(R) that satisfy the invariance axiom,
i.e. then the definition of P on databases translate to P defined on frequency vectors in
the following way:
For all f ∈ ∆ define the function P and its restriction to PT for all T ∈ N on frequency
vectors by
P : X ×∆ → ∆(R) such that P (f) := P (D) for f ∈ ∆ and D ∈ C related by f = fD.
PT : X ×∆T → ∆(R) such that PT (f) := PT (D) for f ∈ ∆T and D ∈ CT related by
f = fD.
As long as no length is fixed, f ∈ ∆ is universal and the length T of the database, which f
represents becomes visible only in the restriction of P (f) to the specific PT (f), i.e. PT pins
down the unique database the frequency vector is able to represent, namely the database
with length T. Of course, under the condition that the frequency vector allows the exis-
tence of such a database in this specific length.
Recall, we assume |C| = m.
Notation:
(i) For all j ∈ {1, 2, ...,m} denote by f j the j-th unit vector in Rm, i.e. the frequency
vector representing a database containing only cases cj ∈ C, hence an extremal point in
∆, i.e. f j = (0, ..., 0, 1︸︷︷︸
j−th
, 0, ..., 0)t
(ii) The frequency vector corresponding to the anchored database Dji (k, T ) = (c
(1−k)T
j , c
kT
i )
is given by
f
Dji (k,T )
= (0, ...0, (1− k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
j−th
, 0, .., 0, k︸︷︷︸
i−th
, 0, ..., 0)t
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Since f
Dji (k,W )
= f
Dji (k,T )
for all T and W, the length is totally immaterial for the frequency
vector and hence neglected from now on, i.e. the frequency vector corresponding to the
anchored databases Dji (k, T ) for all j 6= i ≤ m is denoted for all T such that kT ∈ N by
f ji (k) := fDji (k,T )
Note that f ji (k) is still the whole frequency vector, i.e. f
j
i (k) ∈ ∆, whereas f ji (k)(l)
represents the l-th component of the vector and refers to the frequency of case cl, i.e.
f ji (k)(l) ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q.
Definition
The frequency vector corresponding to a database D ◦ D∗ with corresponding frequency
vectors fD = f ∈ ∆T and fD∗ = f∗ ∈ ∆W is denoted by f ◦ f∗ and given by
f ◦ f∗ =
(f(1)T + f∗(1)W
T +W
, ....,
f(m)T + f∗(m)W
T +W
)t ∈ ∆T+W
Now we need to translate the axioms into this frequency framework.
B.2 Axioms in the frequency framework
Maximal anchored Concatenation Axiom:
(i) Let there be f ∈ ∆T , for all j 6= i ≤ m f ji (f(i)) ∈ ∆Tj and
∑m
j 6=i Tj = T such that for
(αj)j 6=i≤m ∈ [0, 1] and
∑m
j 6=i αj = 1, i.e. f =
∑m
j 6=i αjf
j
i (f(i)).
Let L = L(f(i), (Tj)j 6=i≤m) ∈ N be the corresponding adjusted length, i.e. maxi≤m f(i)T =
maxl≤m f
j
i (f(i)))l)L.
Then there exist λ ∈ ∆m−1 (where λj = 0 for all j 6= i ≤ m such that αj = 0), such that
PT (f) =
∑
j 6=i≤m
λjPL(f
j
i (f(i))
(ii) Let for distinct i, j, l ≤ m f ji (1) ∈ ∆T and f lj(1/2) = (0, ...0, 1/2, 0, ..., 0, 1/2, 0, .., 0)t ∈
∆2W , then there exists a λ ∈ ∆2, such that:
PT+2W (f
j
i (1) ◦ f lj(1/2)) = λPmax{T,W}(f ji (1)) + (1− λ)Pmax{2T,2W}(f lj(1/2))
Constant Similarity Axiom:
(i) Let there be f ∈ ∆T , for all j 6= i ≤ m f ji (f(i)) ∈ ∆Tj such that for (αj)j 6=i≤m ∈ [0, 1]
and
∑m
j 6=i αj = 1, i.e. f =
∑m
j 6=i αjf
j
i (f(i)).
Let L = L(f(i), (Tj)j 6=i≤m) ∈ N be the corresponding adjusted length.
If there exist λ ∈ ∆m−1 (where λj = 0 for all j 6= i ≤ m such that αj = 0), such that for
some Z ∈ N+
PZT (f) =
∑
j 6=i≤m
λjPZL(f
j
i (k)),
then the equation holds for all Z ∈ N+.
(ii) Let for distinct i, j, l ≤ m f ji (1) ∈ ∆T and f lj(1/2) = (0, ...0, 1/2, 0, ..., 0, 1/2, 0, .., 0)t ∈
∆2W , then there exists a λ ∈ ∆2, such that for for some Z ∈ N+
PZ(T+2W )(f
j
i (1) ◦ f lj(1/2)) = λPZmax{T,W}(f ji (1)) + (1− λ)PZmax{2T,2W}(f lj(1/2)),
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then the equation holds for all Z ∈ N+.
Learning Axiom:
For all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., C}: (PT (f i))T∈N+ converges to P∞(f i) = P i∞.
Diversity Axiom:
There exist some T ∗ ∈ N+, such that for all T ≥ T ∗, no three elements of {(PT (f j))j≤m}
are collinear.
Before stating the unproofed direction of Theorem 5.1 in the frequency version, we will
present some helpful remarks and lemmas.
B.3 Useful Observations
Remark B.1
Explicitly the adjusted length defined in Definition 4.2 is given by:
L(k, T1, T2, ..., Tm) =

maxj{Tj} if k ≤ maxj{Tj}maxj{Tj}+T =: k∗ ∈ ( 1m+1 , 12)
k
1−kT if k ∈ (k∗ =
maxj{Tj}
maxj{Tj}+T ,
1
2)
T if k ≥ 12
Remark B.2
For all f ∈ ∆ there exist for all anchor case ci ∈ C, for i ≤ m, a decomposition
f =
∑
j 6=i α
j
if
j
i (f(i)), where for all j 6= i ≤ m, αji ∈ [0, 1] are given by f(j) = αji (1− f(i)).
Note that αji corresponds to the (relative) sizes of the databases D
j
i (f(i), ·) (corresponding
to the particular frequency vectors f ji (f(i))) in relation to the specific database D (which
is represented by the frequency vector f). For instance, assume that f ji (f(i)) ∈ ∆Vj and∑
j 6=i Vj = V , then f ∈ ∆V and αji = VjV .
In general for all j 6= i ≤ m, f ji (f(i)) can represent a database with length t · T˜ ji , where
t ∈ N and T˜ ji ∈ N is the smallest length W such that f(i)W is a natural number (and
hence also (1− f(i))W ∈ N).
To specify the (smallest) length Zi ∈ N of the database D corresponding to the decom-
position of f via anchor case ci, i.e. f =
∑
j 6=i α
j
if
j
i (f(i)), we extend all T˜
j
i ∈ N with
the smallest zji ∈ N such that for j 6= i ≤ m all αji s are the fractions with the smallest
common denominator Zi, i.e. α
j
i =
zji T˜
j
i
Zi
. In this way the smallest lengths of the databases
represented by f ji (f(i)), that can be used for the decomposition of f via anchor ci, are
exactly given by
T ji := z
j
i T˜
j
i = α
j
iZi ∈ N and Zi =
∑
j 6=i≤m
T ji (7)
Hence f ∈ ∆Zi and for all j 6= i ≤ m the f ji (f(i)) ∈ ∆T ji .
Obviously, choosing a different anchor case cl ∈ C for the decomposition of f will lead to a
different smallest denominator Zl (and induced length of database which f represents) and
different lengths of the databases Djl (f(l), T
j
l ) for all j 6= l ≤ m, which are represented by
f jl (f(l)) ∈ ∆T jl .
Definition B.1
For all f ∈ ∆ and i ≤ m, the decomposition f = ∑j 6=i αjif ji (f(i)), where f ji (f(i)) ∈ ∆T ji
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and T ji are as in (7), is called the smallest decomposition of f via anchor case ci ∈ C,
which represents a database of length Zi =
∑
j 6=i≤m T
j
i and is denoted by (f
j
i (f(i)), T
j
i )j 6=i.
The following Lemma shows consistency of the axiomatization with respect to the possible
smallest decompositions based on different anchor cases.
Lemma B.1
Let m ≥ 3. If P : X ×∆ → ∆(R) and its restriction PT to X ×∆ satisfies the maximal
anchored concatenation axiom and the constant similarity axiom. Then, P is well defined
or consistent with respect to the different possible smallest decomposition and for all T ≥ 2
and any f ∈ ∆T
PT (f) =
∑
j≤m
λjPmaxi≤mf(i)T (f
j) (8)
Proof:
For all f ∈ ∆, there exists the smallest decomposition via anchor case ci ∈ C (as in Defini-
tion B.1) (f li (f(i)), T
l
i )l 6=i, where f(l) =
T li
Zi
(1− f(i)) (which implies (1− f(i))T li = f(l)Zi).
We have to show that independent of the choice of the anchor case ci ∈ C, the induced
belief PT (f) is identical for all T ∈ N such that f ∈ ∆T .
We differentiate into the three situations of adjusted lengths given in Remark B.1, which
are based on the different frequencies of chosen anchor case c ∈ C.
(i) Let f(i) ≤ k∗, assume w.l.o.g. that maxl≤m f(l) = f(j), hence maxl≤m T li = T ji :
Applying the maximal anchored concatenation axiom in a first step for k = f(i) ≤
maxj 6=i T
j
i
maxj 6=i T
j
i +Zi
with adjusted length L(f(i), (T li )l 6=i) = T
j
i , and in the second line for k = 0
with adjusted length L(0, f(i)T ji , (1 − f(i))T ji ) = (1 − f(i))T ji and for some a ≤ m such
that a 6= i, l, we get for some λ, γ, β ∈ ∆m:
PZi(f) =
∑
l 6=i
λlPL(f(i),(T li )l6=i)
(f li (f(i))) =
∑
l 6=i
λlPT ji
(f li (f(i)))
=
∑
l 6=i
λl(γlPL(0,f(i)T ji ,(1−f(i))T ji )(f
i
a(0)) + (1− γl)PL(0,f(i)T ji ,(1−f(i))T ji )(f
l
a(0)))
=
∑
l 6=i
λl(γlP(1−f(i))T ji (f
i) + (1− γl)P(1−f(i))T ji (f
l))
=
∑
l
βlP(1−f(i))T ji (f
l) =
∑
l
βlPmaxl≤m f(l)Zi(f
l)
Now by the constant similarity axiom, we get also that PT (f) =
∑
l βlPmaxl≤m f(l)T (f
l) for
all T such that f ∈ ∆T .
(ii) f(i) ∈ (k∗, 1/2), which implies that f(i) ≥ (1 − f(i)) maxj 6=i Tj/T = maxj 6=i jf(j),
i.e. maxl≤mf(l) = f(i):
With L(f(i), (Tj)j 6=i) =
f(i)
1−f(i)Zi:
PZi(f) =
∑
l 6=i
λlPL(f(i),(Tl)l 6=i)(f
l
i (f(i))) =
∑
l 6=i
λlP f(i)
1−f(i)Zi
(f li (f(i)))
=
∑
l 6=i
λl(γlPL(0,f(i) f(i)
1−f(i)Zi,(1−f(i))
f(i)
1−f(i)Zi)
(f i) + (1− γl)PL(0,f(i) f(i)
1−f(i)Zi,(1−f(i))
f(i)
1−f(i)Zi)
(f l))
=
∑
l 6=i
λl(γlPf(i)Zi(f
i) + (1− γl)Pf(i)Zi)(f l) =
∑
l
βlPmaxl≤m f(l)Zi(f
l)
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Again by the constant similarity axiom, we get that PT (f) =
∑
l βlPmaxl≤m f(l)T (f
l) for all
T such that f ∈ ∆T .
(iii) f(i) ≥ 1/2, i.e. f(i) is maximal frequency, which gives L(f(i), (Tl)l 6=i) = Zi, hence
PZi(f) =
∑
l 6=i
λlPL(f(i),(Tl)l 6=i)(f
l
i (f(i))) =
∑
l 6=i
λlPZi(f
l
i (f(i)))
=
∑
l 6=i
λl(γlPL(0,f(i)Zi,(1−f(i))Zi)(f
i) + (1− γl)PL(0,f(i)Zi,(1−f(i))Zi)(f l))
=
∑
l 6=i
λl(γlPf(i)Zi(f
i) + (1− γl)Pf(i)Zi(f l)) =
∑
l
βlPmaxl≤m f(l)Zi(f
l)
Again by the constant similarity axiom, we get that PT (f) =
∑
l βlPmaxl≤m f(l)T (f
l) for all
T such that f ∈ ∆T . 
Remark B.3
In the proof above, of course, it would be sufficient to prove (i) and combine it with the fact
that for all f ∈ ∆, there exist i 6= j ≤ m, such that f(i) ≤ k∗, otherwise for l ≤ m f(l) ≥
maxj 6=i T
j
i
maxj 6=i T
j
i +Zi
and hence
∑
l≤m f(l) ≥ (n+1) maxj 6=i T
j
i
maxj 6=i T
j
i +Zi
≥ 1 since Zi ≤ n(maxj 6=i T ji ). But
it would not show directly the consistency wrt. the different particular decompositions.
Remark B.4
Let f ∈ ∆ be expressed as convex combination of the set {f1, f2, f3} for some fi ∈ ∆T for
all i = 1, 2, 3, i.e. f = β1f1 + β2f2 + (1− β1 − β2)f3.
As in Remark B.2 we apply the relativ length interpretation of the weights βi ∈ (0, 1) for
all i = 1, 2, 3, to get the (potentially) smallest induced length H of the database represented
by f via the convex combination of databases Di ∈ CT , which are represented by fi ∈ ∆T .
That is, H is again the smallest possible denominator of all βi such that for all i = 1, 2, 3
βi =
ziT
H for some zi ∈ N and hence we have that f ∈ ∆H can be combined by the decom-
position (fi)i≤3, where fi ∈ ∆βiH=ziT for i = 1, 2, 3.
The following Lemma mirrors Lemma A.4 in EG.
Lemma B.2
Let P satisfy the maximal anchored concatenation and constant similarity axiom. For
m ≥ 3 let (sj)j≤m be a collection of similarity weights. Define the function P s : X ×
∆(C) → ∆(R) and for any T ∈ N, T ≥ 2 and any f ∈ ∆T the restriction P sT to X ×∆T
by
P sT (f) =
∑
j≤m sjf(j)Pmaxj≤m f(j)T (f
j)∑
j≤m sjf(j)
Suppose that for some T ≥ T ∗ and f ∈ ∆T it holds PT (f) = P sT (f).
Then, PW (f) = P
s
W (f) for all W ∈ Z such that f ∈ ∆W
Proof:
Let T (f) be the smallest T such that f ∈ ∆T (f), this implies that for all l ∈ N f ∈ ∆lT (f).
By Lemma B.1 we know that P can be represented as in representation (8) , hence we get
the following.
If there exist some λ ∈ ∆m (with λi = 0 if and only if f(i) = 0) such that it satisfies for
some l ∈ N+,
PlT (f)(f) =
m∑
j=1
λjPmaxi≤mf(i)T (f)(f
j),
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then by the constant similarity axiom it also holds for all l ∈ N+. In particular, for l such
that lT (f) = T the following holds:
PT (f) =
m∑
j=1
λjPmaxi≤mf(i)T (f)(f
j)
by ass
=
∑m
j=1 sjf(j)Pmaxi≤mf(i)T (f
j)∑m
j=1 sjf(j)
= P sT (f)
By the Diversity axiom’s non-collinearity condition, we get λj =
sjf(j)∑m
j=1 sjf(j)
.
Since P slT (f) =
∑m
j=1 sjf(j)Pmaxi≤mf(i)lT (f)(f
j)∑m
j=1 sjf(j)
=
∑m
j=1 λjPmaxi≤mf(i)T (f)(f
j) = PlT (f)(f) for
all l, the proof is completed. .
B.4 Theorem 5.1 (i) ⇒ (ii) in frequency version
Theorem B.1
Let there be given a function P : X ×∆→ ∆(R). Let PT the restriction of P to X ×∆T
and let for T ≥ 2 PT : ∆T → ∆(R) satisfy the following conditions
(i) Learning Axiom
(ii) Diversity Axiom
(iii) Maximal Anchored Concatenation Axiom
(iv) Constant Similarity Axiom
Then, for all T ≥ 2, there exist unique probability vectors (P jT )j≤C ∈ ∆(R), and unique
-up to multiplication by a strictly positive number- positive numbers (sj)j≤m ∈ R+, such
that for every f ∈ ∆T :
PT (f) =
∑
j≤qm sjf(j)P
j
maxj f(j)·T∑
j≤m sjf(j)
(9)
Proof
Obviously, we have to define P jT = PT (f
j) for all T ≥ 2 and j ≤ m.
For the representation, we have to show that there are positive numbers (sj)j≤C such
that the representation holds for all T ≥ 2 and for every f ∈ ∆T .
Rough sketch of the proof:
In general the proof follows the rough structure of BGSS, i.e. the idea to translate the
framework form databases to frequencies to exploit the simplex structures. To derive the
similarity values first for a set of basic cases consisting only of three cases and then use
the gained results for the generalization to any finite number of basic cases is also based
on BGSS. But except of the rough structure, the proof presented here needs different ar-
guments to complete the different parts of the proof. In particular the anchored version
version of the combination axiom requires a different way (compared to BGSS and hence
also EG, which follows a very similar approach) to show the main crucial step of the proof.
Namely, in BGSS the combination of any databases or frequency vector is allowed. Also
in EG the combination of any frequency vectors (by taking care about the lengths and
the constant similarity axiom) is basically possible. However in this paper only specific
anchored databases or frequency vectors can be combined, which requires a different ap-
proach. As in EG, the constant similarity axiom is an important ingredient to facilitate
the proof.
Rough Steps:
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In Step 1 we proof the theorem for a set of basic cases consisting only of three different
basic cases, i.e. C = {c1, c2, c2}.
Step 1.1: Determination of the similarity values s1, s2, s3
Similar to BGSS and EG, we derive the similarity weights s1, s2, s3 ∈ R+, by apply-
ing the anchored concatenation axiom, constant similarity axiom and the diversity axiom.
More specifically: The representation (8) in Lemma B.1 and the representation (9) in The-
orem B.1 applied to f := 13(f
1 + f2 + f3) yields (with the Diversity axiom) the similarity
values, which allows the definition of P sT (f) :=
∑
j≤3 sjf(j)P
j
maxj f(j)T∑
j≤3 sjf(j)
for all f ∈ ∆(C) and
T ∈ N.
Step 1.2: Show that PT (f) = P
s
T (f) for all simplicial points (Figure 1 illustrates sim-
plicial partitions and points)
The main tool to show this claim is the observation that for four specifically struc-
tured frequency vectors, which fulfill the above equation, also the intersection of the lines
between two of these (specific) vectors satisfies the above equation (Lemma B.4). The
crucial step in the proof is to apply his fact in a appropriate way (different than in BGSS,
EG) inductively. In this step again the maximal anchored concatenation axiom and the
constant similarity axiom (in form of Lemma B.2) are necessary.
Step 1.3: Show that PT (f) = P
s
T (f) for all frequency vectors f ∈ ∆(C)
The proof is similar to a (rewritten/revised) proof of Lemma A.6 in EG, which is based
on the existence of the limit of P cT for all c ∈ C (Learning axiom). Since all frequency
vectors f ∈ ∆ can be approximated by a series of simplicical triangles/points, we can
show the claim (by using Lemma B.1 and Lemma B.2). In particular, one can show that
the beliefs P and P s induced by the sequence of simplicial points, which approximates f,
converges to the belief of P and P s induced by the limit f. Using the equivalence of P sT (g)
and PT (g) for the sequence of simplicial points g ∈ ∆ by Step 1.2 and the Diversity Axiom
will deliver the claim.
In Step 2, the result from step 1 is used inductively for a general set of basic cases
C = {c1, c2, ..., cm} with m > 3.
Step: 2.1: Defining the similarity weights s1, ..., sm
Step 1 is applied to any triple of cases {cj , ck, cl} ⊆ C for distinct j, k, l ∈ {1, 2, ...,m},
yielding similarity weights s
(j,k,l)
j , s
(j,k,l)
k , s
(j,k,l)
l . As in the proof of Proposition 3, Step
2.1 in BGSS, one can show that each similarity weight can be chosen independent of the
choice of the triple, i.e. s
(j,k,l)
j = sj . Hence as in Step 1.1. we can define P
s
T (f) :=∑
j≤m sjf(j)P
j
maxj f(j)T∑
j≤m sjf(j)
for all f ∈ ∆(C) and T ∈ N.
Step 2.2: Show PT (f) = P
s
T (f) for all f ∈ ∆(C)
This is done inductively on |M | = m for f ∈ conv({(f j)j∈M}), where we use Step
1 for m = 3 as start of the induction. Each f ∈ ∆ can be decomposed based on dif-
ferent anchors (Remark B.2). Applying the maximal anchored concatenation axiom to
these decompositions yield hyperplanes, which are spanned by (P (f ji (f(i))))j 6=i≤m, for dif-
ferent i ≤ m. All these hyperplanes contain P (f) and also include P s(f) as well, since
PT (f
j
i (k)) = P
s
T (f
j
i (k)) for any i 6= j ≤ m and f ji (k) ∈ ∆T . Using the constant similarity
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axiom (Lemma B.2) and Lemma B.1 to harmonize the different hyperplanes wrt. lengths,
we can show that the intersection of all these induced hyperplanes is unique, which delivers
the desired result.
B.5 Step 1: C = {c1, c2, c3}, i.e. m = 3
Step 1.1:
Define f :=
∑
j≤3 1/3f
j , for f j ∈ ∆T , and T ≥ T ∗ then f ∈ ∆3T . We can choose positive
numbers s1, s2, s3 such that representation holds for f by equating the evaluation of f
using the representation (8) in Lemma B.1 , i.e. P3T (f) = λ1P
1
T + λ2P
2
T + (1− λ1− λ2)P 3T
with representation (9) in Theorem B.1 and solving the linear system. The solution of this
linear system s1, s2, s3 exist uniquely up to multiplication by a positive number due to the
non collinearity condition of the Diversity Axiom for T ≥ T ∗, otherwise uniqueness is not
achievable.
Define for all T and f ∈ ∆T
P sT (f) :=
∑
j≤3 sjf(j)P
j
maxj f(j)T∑
j≤3 sjf(j)
(10)
Obviously P sT (f
j) = PT (f
j) for all j = 1, 2, 3 and P sT (f) = PT (f).
The aim is to show for all T and for every f ∈ ∆T :
P sT (f) = PT (f) (11)
In the following, we will partition the simplex ∆ into so called simplicical triangles recur-
sively, as illustrated in the Figure 1 below.
Definition of Simplicical Triangles:
The 0-th simplicical partition consist of vertices qj0 ∈ ∆, which are exactly the unit vectors
f j for j = 1, 2, 3. The first simplicial partition of ∆ is a partition to four triangles separated
by the segments connecting the middle points between the two of the three unit frequency
vectors, i.e. q11 := (
1
2f
1 + 12f
2), q21 := (
1
2f
2 + 12f
3) and q31 := (
1
2f
3 + 12f
1). The second
simplicial partition is obtained by similarly partitioning each of the four triangles to four
smaller triangles, and the l-th simplicial partition is defined recursively. The simplicial
points of the l-th simplicial partition are all the vertices of triangles of this partition. Note
f1 f2
f3
q21q
3
1
q11
•
•
•
• •
•
Abbildung 1: a
1
f1 f2
f3
q21q
3
1
q11
•
•
•
• •
••
q12
•
q22
•q32 •
q42
•
q52
• q62
•
q72
•q82 • q92
Abbildung 1: a
1
Figure 1: 1st and 2nd Simplicical partitions
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that for j = 1, 2, 3 the qj0 are frequency vectors representing databases consisting only of
1 case, but of any length T ∈ N, i.e. qj0 ∈ ∆T for all T ∈ N+. All vertices qvl of the l-th
simplicial partition are in ∆2lT for all T ∈ N+ for appropriate v ≤ nl as defined below.
Considering the simplicial points on the line between f1 and f2, we get for the 0-th simpli-
cical partition: 2 simplicical points, for 1-th simplicical partition: 3 simplicical points: 3,
for 2-th simplicical partition: simplicical points, for 3-th simplicical partition: 9 simplicical
points and so forth, i.e. it follows the series al = 2
l + 1 for all l ∈ N. Observe that for each
parallel line to (f1, f2) between simplicial points of the l-th simplicical partition, the line
which is one ’step’ closer to f3, possesses one simplicical point less than the farther parallel
line. The number of simplicial points on these parallel lines decreases until reaching the
point f3. Hence the total number nl of simplicial points of the l-th partition is given by
nl :=
al∑
i=1
i =
2l+1∑
i=1
i = 22l−1 + 2l + 2l−1 + 1 where al = 2l + 1 (12)
(13)
Step 1.2: Equation (11) holds for all Simplicial Points
In the following, we will partition the simplex into simplicical triangles and will show
that the vertices of these triangles satisfies equation (11).
Lemma B.3
The vertices qvl with v ≤ nl of the l-th simplicial partition satisfy equation (11) for all
l ∈ N.
Proof
Main tool of the proof is the following Lemma.
Notation: In the following we will denote for a, b ∈ ∆ or a, b ∈ ∆(R) the straight line
through a and b by (a, b) (since there won’t be a confusion to the usual interval notation).
Lemma B.4
Let a, b, c, d ∈ ∆ be distinct frequency vector satisfying equation (11) and the lines (a, b)
and (c, d) are not collinear. Then the intersection y of the line (a,b) and (c,d), i.e. y =
(a, b) ∩ (c, d) satisfies equation (11) (for an appropriate length T , i.e. such that y ∈ ∆T ))
if the following conditions hold for both of the pairs a, b and c, d:
(i) both vectors a and b (respectively c and d) lie on a line (f ji (k), f
h
i (k)) for some k ∈ [0, 1]
and distinct i, j, h ≤ m, which represent anchored databases with identical anchor case
ci ∈ C or
(ii) a, b (respectively c, d) lie on a line between (f ji (1), f
h
j (1/2)) for some distinct i, j, h ≤ m.
Proof
We will show the situation, where both pairs a, b and c, d satisfy condition (i).
Assume that a, b ∈ (f ji (k), fhi (k)), hence also y ∈ (f ji (k), fhi (k)). Hence by Remark B.2
we know that there exist a decomposition of y via (f ji (k), f
h
i (k)), i.e. there exist some
α ∈ (0, 1) and Zy ∈ N such that y = αf ji (k) + (1 − α)fhi (k) ∈ ∆Zy with corresponding
adjusted length Ly := L(k, αZy, (1− α)Zy) such that PZy(y) ∈
(
PLy(f
j
i (k)), PLy(f
h
i (k))
)
.
Analogously, there exist some Zx and Lx for all x ∈ {a, b}. Let L := LCM(Zy, Za, Zb),
then for all v ∈ {y, a, b} the following holds
PZvL
Lv
(v) ∈ (PL(f ji (k)), PL(fhi (k)))
In particular PZaL
La
(a) and PZbL
Lb
(b) determine already the shape/slope of the line(
PL(f
j
i (k)), PL(f
h
i (k))
)
and hence PZyL
Ly
(y) ∈
(
PZaL
La
(a), PZbL
Lb
(b)
)
.
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The same derivation can be executed with P s and results in P sZyL
Ly
(y) ∈
(
P sZaL
La
(a), P s
ZbL
Lb
(b)
)
and since we know that a, b ∈ ∆ satisfy (11), we get:
PZyL
Ly
(y), P sZyL
Ly
(y) ∈
(
PZaL
La
(a), PZbL
Lb
(b)
)
The same procedure applied to pair c, d instead to a, b with G := LCM(Ly, Lc, Ld) yields:
PZyG
Ly
(y), P sZyG
Ly
(y) ∈
(
PZcG
Lc
(c), PZbG
Lc
(c)
)
Finding a common multiplier J = LCM(L,G) will deliver the desired result, since
PZyJ
Ly
(y), P sZyJ
Ly
(y) ∈
(
P ZaJ
LaG
(a), P ZbJ
GLb
(b)
)
∩
(
PZcJ
LLc
(c), PJZd
LLd
(d)
)
and the intersection is unique (otherwise this would be a contradiction to the diversity
axiom). Hence P s
Zy J
Ly
(y) = PZy J
Ly
(y) and by Lemma B.2 PT (y) = P
s
T (y) for all T such
that y ∈ ∆T .
The situation, in which one of the two pairs satisfies condition (i) and the other con-
dition (ii) or both pairs fulfill condition (ii) can be shown analogously. 
The proof of the theorem is conducted by using the observation in Lemma B.4 induc-
tively, as can be seen in the series of figures (Figures 2 and 3) below.
Proof by induction over the l-th partition:
For l = 0:
By Step 1.1, we know that for (q1 = q10, q
2 = q20, q
3 = q30) the representation holds.
Induction step:
Let the claim be true for the l-th simplicical partition. For the (l + 1)-th partition the
following procedure will capture all simplicical points qvl+1 for v ≤ nl+1.
The procedure, which can be understand easily in the series of Figures 2 to 4, is expressed
in quite extensive notational effort below.
We need some definitions:
(i) We will denote by g
(i,j)
l (d) the simplicical point in the l-th partition on the line (f
i, f j)
such that it is the d closest to f i. More precisely, let for all i 6= j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and for all
l ∈ N:
g
(i,j)
l (d) ∈ {qxl ∈ (f i, f j) | there exists (d-1) many distinct qtl ∈ (f i, f j) for t, x ≤ nl
s. th. ‖f i − qtl+‖ < ‖f i − qxl ‖}
where || · || is the standard norm on R|R|.
(ii) We denote by bil+1(d) the simplical point of the (l + 1)-th partition, which lies on the
line (f i, q∗) and the d- closest line in the (l + 1)-th partition parallel to f j , fh for distinct
i,j,k.
Lines between these points are essential to cover all simplicial points through intersections.
More precisely, define for all ∈ N and all distinct i, j, h ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
bil+1(d) := (f
i, 1/2(f j + fh))∩ (g(i,j)l (d), g(i,h)l (d)) (remember 1/2(f j + fh) = fhj (1/2) = qw1
for some w ∈ 1, 2, 3, i.e. 1/2(f j + fh)) satisfy equation (11)).
Procedure:
(i) For d = 1:
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Figure 2: From 2nd to 3rd Simplicical partition points
Assume that all simplicial points (bullets) of the 2-nd partition satisfy already equation (11). Here
some points are named according to the notation used in the procedure.
For example take the simplicial points of the 2nd partition that is on (f1, f2) and closest to f1, i.e.
g
(1,2)
2 (1). Analogously, take the closest to f
1 on (f1, f3), i.e. g
(1,3)
2 (1). Intersecting (g
(1,2)
2 (1), g
(1,3)
2 (1))
with (f1, q21) shows that b
1
3(1) satisfies equation (11) as well. Analogously, this can be shown for b
i
3(1)
(i = 2, 3) using appropriate combinations of g
(i,j)
2 (1), q
m
1 , f
h
W.l.o.g. take the perspective of f j = f1 for a j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Given the l-th simplicical
partition, there exist a simplicial point of the (l+ 1)-th simplicial partition b1l+1(1), which
is the intersection of the lines (f1, f2) and (g
(1,2)
l (1), g
(1,3)
l (1))). By the induction assump-
tion these pairs of points satisfy equation (11) and the conditions of the Lemma B.4 and
hence P s
2l+1
(b1l+1) = P2l+1(b
1
l+1), i.e. b
1
l+1(1) satisfies equation (11). Analogously the same
procedure applied to f j for j = 2, 3 yields that bjl+1(1) satisfies equation (11).
(ii) Draw the line between two elements of {b1l+1(1), b2l+1(1), b3l+1(1)}, w.l.o.g. take b1l+1(1)
and b3l+1(1). The line (b
1
l+1(1), b
3
l+1(1)) intersects for all 0 ≤ z ≤ al (defined above (12))
with the lines (g
(1,3)
l (z), g
(2,3)
l (z)) which are parallel to the line (f
1, f2) and also with all
lines (g
(1,2)
l (z), g
(1,3)
l (z)) which are parallel to (f
2, f3). By Lemma B.4 this yields, that
all simplicical points of the (l + 1)-th partition, which lie on the line (b1l+1(1), b
3
l+1(1)) are
satisfying equation (11).
Analogously, the procedure yields, that all simplicical points of the (l + 1)-th partition,
which lie on the lines (bil+1(1), b
j
l+1(1)) for all combinations of i 6= j ∈ {1, 2, 3} are satisfy-
ing equation (11), i.e. which are on the closest parallel lines to (f1, f2), (f1, f3), (f2, f3)
and in particular, the closest (l+ 1)-simplicial points to f1, f2, f3 on the rim/boundary of
conv({f1, f2, f3}).
(iii) Apply the procedure of (i) and (ii) (where d = 1) recursively for d = 2n − 1 > 1
for 2 ≤ n ≤ al+1−12 (from f1- view).
Derive {b1l+1(d), b2l+1(d), b3l+1(d)} by (i) using fh and (g(i,j)l (d) for i, j, h ∈ {1, 2, 3} appropri-
ately. Using (ii), we can show that all simplicical points of the (l + 1)-th partition, which
lie on the lines (bil+1(d), b
j
l+1(d)) for all combinations of i 6= j ∈ {1, 2, 3} are satisfying
equation (11).
Observe that for d = 2n with 1 ≤ n ≤ al+1−12 the simplicial points of the (l + 1)-th
partition, which lie on the lines (bil+1(d), b
j
l+1(d)) for all combinations of i 6= j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
are already satisfying the equation (11) directly, since these lines already are ’used’ for the
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Figure 3: From 2nd to 3rd Simplicical partition points
a) Using lines (bi3(1), b
j
3(1)) and their intersections with existing lines, will show equation (11) for all
simplicical points of the 3rd partition, which are on the closest parallel lines to the rim of the simplex.
b) Now, consider the simplicial points of the 2nd partition, which are on the lines (f i, f j) and third
(since the second closest are covered indirectly) closest to f i. For example, take g
(1,2)
2 (3) (third closest
to f1 on line (f1, f2)) and g
(1,3)
2 (3)) (third closest to f
1 on (f1, f3)). Intersecting of (g
(1,2)
2 (3), g
(1,3)
2 (3))
with (f1, q21) shows that b
1
3(3) satisfies equation (11) as well. Analogously, this can be shown for b
i
3(3)
(i = 2, 3) using appropriate combinations of g
(i,j)
2 (3), q
m
1 , f
h.
procedure in the l-th partition and the simplicial points of the (l+ 1)-th partition are just
indirectly processed via the the intersection steps in (ii).
B.5.1 Step 1.3: Completion to all f ∈ ∆
Lemma B.5
For all 2 ≤ T ∈ N and f ∈ ∆T : PT (f) = P sT (f).
Before we proof the Lemma, we mention some helpful considerations.
For each f ∈ ∆ there exists a sequence of simplicical triangles (qill , qjll , qhll )l∈N (remember
qvl ∈ ∆2l for all v ≤ nl) for distinct il, jl, hl ≤ nl, such that:
(i) f ∈ conv({qill , qjll , qhll }) for all l ∈ N, i.e. there exist βvl ∈ [0, 1] for all v ∈ {il, jl, hl}
such that f = βill q
il
l + β
jl
l q
jl
l + β
hl
l q
hl
l
(ii) For all v ∈ {il, jl, hl} and l ∈ N:
qvl ∈ ∆βvl Hl , such that Hl (as in Remark B.4) is the smallest common denominator of all
βvl , i.e. there exist z
v
l , such that β
v
l =
zvl 2
l
Hl
. Hence, if f is represented by combination of an
l-th simplicical triangle, then f ∈ ∆Hl
(iii) liml→∞qvl = f for all v ∈ {il, jl, hl}
Clearly this construction is possible for all f ∈ ∆.
To proof the Lemma, i.e. f ∈ ∆T : PT (f) = P sT (f), we proceed with the following steps.
If we could show that liml→∞||P sHl(f)−P sHl(qvl )|| = 0 and lim→∞ ||PHl(f)−PHl(qvl )|| = 0
for all v ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the result would follow from PHl(qvl ) = P sHl(qvl ) (by Step 1.2) and the
Diversity and Constant similarity axiom.
Proof of Lemma B.5
Step (i):
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Figure 4: As before, the next step would be to intersect the lines between (bi3(1), b
j
3(1)) and the existing
lines, will show equation (11) for all simplicical points of the 3rd partition, which are on the third
closest parallel lines to the rim of the simplex, which completes the 3rd partition.
By the learning axiom and since P sT (f
i) = PT (f
i) for all T ∈ N, we know that for all
i ≤ 3, we have liml→∞P sHl(f i) = P∞(f i) = P i∞.
We want to show for all v ∈ {il, jl, hl}: liml→∞||P sHl(f)− P sHl(qvl )|| = 0.
Let for all r ∈ R, P iT (r) be the r-th component of the probability vector.
For all l, v ∈ {il, jl, hl} and qvl we have that liml→∞ qvl = f and hence liml→∞ P jmaxj qvl (j)Hl(r) =
P jmaxj f(j)Hl(r) holds. This directly implies liml→∞(P
s
Hl
(f)(r)−P sHl(qvl )(r)) = 0 for all r ∈ R
and hence the desired result.
Step (ii):
By Lemma B.1 we know, that PH(f) =
∑3
j=1 λjPmaxi=1,2,3 f(i)H(f
j) where λ ∈ ∆2 is
independent of the length of the database by the constant similarity axiom.
Hence by the learning axiom liml→∞PHl(f) = liml→∞
∑3
j=1 λjPmax{i=1,2,3} f(i)(Hl)(f
j) ex-
ists and hence with the same reasoning as above in the case of P s, we know that
liml→∞||PHl(qvl )− PHl(f)|| = 0 for all v ∈ {il, jl, hl}
Step (iii):
By Step (i) and (ii) and the triangle inequality, we get:
liml→∞||P sHl(f)− P sHl(qvl )− PHl(f) + PHl(qvl )|| = 0
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Since for all l, we know that PHl(q
v
l ) = P
s
Hl
(qvl ), we have liml→∞||(P sHl(f)−(PHl(f))|| = 0,
which implies for all r ∈ R:
0 = liml→∞(PHl(f)(r)− P sHl(f)(r))
= liml→∞
( 3∑
j=1
λjPmaxi f(j)Hl(f
j)(r)−
∑
j≤3 sjf(j)P
j
maxj f(j)Hl
(r)∑
j≤3 sjf(j)
)
= liml→∞
3∑
j=1
Pmaxi f(j)Hl(f
j)(r)
(
λj − sjf(j)∑
j≤3 sjf(j)
)
=
3∑
j=1
P∞(f j)(r)
(
λj − sjf(j)∑
j≤3 sjf(j)
)
By the Diversity axiom, no three of P∞(f j) are collinear (i.e. also no P∞(f j)(r) are convex
combinations), which implies that it must hold that λj =
sjf(j)∑
j≤3 sjf(j)
for all j = 1, 2, 3, hence
PLl(f) = P
s
Ll
(f) for all l and by the constant similarity Lemma B.2 PT (f) = P
s
T (f) such
that f ∈ ∆T . .
The proof for C = {c1, c2, c3} is concluded.
B.6 Step 2: m > 3:
B.6.1 Step 2.1 Defining the similarity weights:
Consider for T ≥ T ∗ and distinct j, k, l ≤ m a triple {P jT , P kT , P lT }
Using the considerations from B.5 Step 1 for {j, k, l}, i.e. f3T :=
∑
i∈{j,k,l} f
i and f i ∈ ∆T ,
we can derive the similarity weights (s
{j,k,l}
i )i∈{j,k,l} and the following representation for
all f ∈ conv({f j , fk, f l}) ∩∆T :
P
{j,k,l}
T (f) =
∑
i=j,k,l s
{j,k,l}
i f(i)P
{j,k,l}
maxif(i)T
(f i)∑
i=j,k,l s
{j,k,l}f(i)
i
Moreover for all i ∈ {j, k, l}, we have P {j,k,l}T (f i) = PT (f i) = P iT and (s{j,k,l}i )i∈{j,k,l} are
unique up to multiplication by a positive number.
Now we want to show, that the similarity values s
{j,k,l}
i are independent of the choice
of j, k and l for all i ∈ {j, k, l}. This can be shown in two steps:
1. Show that
s
{j,k,l}
j
s
{j,k,l}
k
=
s
{j,k,n}
j
s
{j,k,n}
k
,
i.e. the ratio between two similarity number is independent of the choice of a third
case/frequency. Take two different triples {j, k, l} and {j, k, n}, i.e. l 6= n. Consider
the evaluation of rational combinations of f j ∈ ∆T and fk ∈ ∆T , i.e. for α ∈ Q:
f = αf j + (1 − α)fk, where H is the smallest common denominator of α, (1 − α) and
hence f ∈ ∆H , w.l.o.g. assume α ≥ (1− α). Then,
P
{j,k,l}
H (f) =
s
{j,k,l}
j αP
j
αH+s
{j,k,l}
k (1−α)PkαH
s
{j,k,l}
j α+s
{j,k,l}
k (1−α)
and P
{j,k,n}
H (f) =
s
{j,k,n}
j αP
j
αH+s
{j,k,n}
k (1−α)PkαH
s
{j,k,n}
j α+s
{j,k,n}
k (1−α)
.
Equating these two expressions, we get:
s
{j,k,l}
j α
s
{j,k,l}
j α+s
{j,k,l}
k (1−α)
=
s
{j,k,n}
j α
s
{j,k,n}
j α+s
{j,k,n}
k (1−α)
and
s
{j,k,l}
k (1−α)
s
{j,k,l}
j α+s
{j,k,l}
k (1−α)
=
s
{j,k,n}
k (1−α)
s
{j,k,n}
j α+s
{j,k,n}
k (1−α)
,
which leads to
s
{j,k,l}
j
s
{j,k,l}
k
=
s
{j,k,n}
j
s
{j,k,n}
k
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Denote this ratio by Sj,k :=
s
{j,k,l}
j
s
{j,k,l}
k
, this ratio is defined for all distinct j, k ≤ m, since
strict positivity of the similarity numbers.
Further observe that the following holds:
Sj,kSk,lSl,j =
s
{j,k,l}
j
s
{j,k,l}
k
s
{j,k,l}
k
s
{j,k,l}
l
s
{j,k,l}
l
s
{j,k,l}
j
= 1 (14)
2. Define s1 := 1 and sj = Sj,1 for all j ≤ m.
Aim: To show that for all triple j, k, l ≤ m it holds that s{j,k,l}i = asi for some a ∈ R+.
If we can show that
s
{j,k,l}
i
s
{j,k,l}
m
= sism for for all m 6= i ∈ {j, k, l}, then we are done, since then
s
{j,k,l}
i =
si
sm
s
{j,k,l}
m = asi for all m 6= i ∈ {j, k, l}, e.g. with m = k we have a = s
{j,k,l}
k
sk
and
hence s
{j,k,l}
j = asj , s
{j,k,l}
k =
s
{j,k,l}
k
sk
sk, s
{j,k,l}
l = asl.
hence it suffices to show w.l.o.g. that
s
{j,k,l}
j
s
{j,k,l}
k
=
sj
sk
or equivalent Sj,k =
sj
sk
.
But the latter directly follows from (14), i.e. 1 = S1,jSj,kSk,1 = 1/sjSj,ksk, hence Sj,k =
sj
sk
and hence the desired result.
The independence of the similarity values s
{j,k,l}
i on {j, k, l} allows to replace the (unique
up to multiplication by a strictly positive number) s
{j,k,l}
i by the just defined si for all
i ≤ m, i.e. given these (si)i≤m, one can define as in the consideration in B.5 Step 1.1:
For all 2 ≤ T ∈ N and any f ∈ ∆T .
P sT (f) :=
∑
i≤m sif(i)P
i
maxif(i)T∑
i≤m sif(i)
(15)
As in the section before the aim is to show that for all T and any f ∈ ∆T the following
equation holds: P sT (f) = PT (f).
B.6.2 Step 2.2: Completion to all f ∈ ∆
Let ∆MT := ∆T ∩ conv({f j | j ∈M}) denote the set of all frequency vectors f ∈ ∆T , which
assign zero appearance to all cases (ci)i∈{1,2,...,m}\M , i.e. only cases (cj)j∈M appear with
positive frequency.
We will show by induction on |M | = m for 3 ≤ m ≤ m the following claim.
Lemma B.6 For every subset M ⊆ {1, 2, ....,m} with |M | = m ≥ 3, PT (f) = P sT (f),
holds for every f ∈ ∆MT
Proof:
For m = 3 the claim has been shown in B.5 Step 1 (Step 1.3 in Lemma B.5).
Hence we assume now, that the claim holds for m ≥ 3 and we prove it for M with
|M | = m+ 1.
1) Let f ∈ ∆MT such that f ∈ conv({f j}j∈M\l) for some l ∈ M , then by induction as-
sumption P sT (f) = PT (f).
2) Now we consider f ∈ int(conv({f l | l ∈M}))
By Remark B.2 we know that for all i ∈M and l ∈M\{i}, there exist for all l 6= i ≤ m some
αli ∈ (0, 1) and
∑
l∈M\{i} α
l
i = 1 such that f =
∑
l∈M\{i} α
l
if
l
i (f(i)) with f
l
i (f(i)) ∈ ∆T li
and then f ∈ ∆Zl (where T ji = αjiZi). W.l.o.g. (due to constant similarity axiom, Lemma
B.2) assume that for all l 6= i ≤ m there exist T li such that max{f(i), (1 − f(i))}T li ≥ T ∗
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(to overcome potential collinearity problems). For each i ∈M the corresponding adjusted
lengths L(f(i), (T ji )j 6=i∈M ) are abbreviated by Li in the following.
Now, the maximal anchored concatenation axiom induces that PZl(f) lies on the follow-
ing induced (m + 1)-many hyper-planes Am+1l (Zl) for all l ∈ M , w.l.o.g. assume that
M = {1, 2, ...,m+ 1}:
PZ1(f) ∈ int(conv({PL1(f21 (f(1))), PL1(f31 (f(1))), ..., PL1(fm+11 (f(1)))})) =: Am+11 (Z1)
PZ2(f) ∈ int(conv({PL2(f12 (f(2))), PL2(f32 (f(2))), ..., PL2(fm+12 (f(2)))})) =: Am+12 (Z2)
∈ · · ··
PZm+1(f) ∈ int(conv({PLm+1(f1m+1(f(m+ 1))), PLm+1(f2m+1(f(m+ 1))), .....
....., PLm+1(f
m
m+1(f(m+ 1)))})) =: Am+1m+1(Zm+1)
Since for all l 6= j ≤ m, P sT (f jl (f(l))) = PT (f jl (f(l))) for all T such that f jl (fl) ∈ ∆T , we
have also P sZl(f) ∈ Am+1l (Zl) for all l ∈M .
For Z = LCM(Z1, ...Zm+1), the constant similarity axiom (Lemma B.2) implies that
PZ(f), P
s
Z(f) ∈ Am+1l (Z) for all l ∈M , i.e. PZ(f), P sZ(f) ∈
⋂
l∈M A
m+1
l (Z). By Lemma B.1
we have that for all l ∈ M the sets Am+1l (Z) consist of identical (P jmaxl∈Mf(l)Z)j∈M (with
different positive weights after evaluation of PZ(f
j
i (f(i)) = λjP
j
max{f(i),(1−f(i))}Z + (1 −
λj)P
i
max{f(i),(1−f(i))}Z for particular λj ∈ (0, 1)) .
This implies that determining
⋂
l∈M A
m+1
l (Z) means solving the (m+1)×(m+1) system of
linear equations. We know that |⋂l∈M Am+1l (Z)| ≥ 1, since P sZ(f) and PZ(f) are included
in the intersection. The claim of PZ(f) = P
s
Z(f) would be proofed if we can show that⋂
l∈M A
m+1
l (Z) is a singleton.
We will proof this by contradiction:
Assume that PZ(f) 6= P sZ(f), then the line g := (PZ(f), P sZ(f)) has to be contained
in Am+1l (Z) for all l ∈ M . Hence this line g must intersect two of the faces Hj (of
dim(conv({P jmaxi≤m f(i)Z}{j∈M}))− 1), defined for all j ∈M by
Hj := conv({(P kmaxi≤m f(i)Z)k∈M\{j}}). W.l.o.g. let these two faces be named Hu, Hv for
some distinct u, v ∈ M . But then for all l ∈ M Am+1l (Z) has to intersect with these two
faces Hu, Hv. We will show that this is not true. Observe that each A
m+1
l (Z) intersects
with all (Hj)j 6=l∈M . Further, observe that applying the successive intersection, we get for
t ≤ m + 1 ∩tj=1Am+1j (Z) = {Ht+1, ...Hm+1}, which implies ∩m+1j=1 Am+1j (Z) = ∅, i.e. there
exist no dim(conv({P jmaxi≤m f(i)Z}{j∈M}))−1)-faces such that all A
m+1
l (Z) intersect them.
Hence there cannot exist g such that g ∈ Ak+1l (Z) for all l ∈ M , which implies that
there cannot be more than one unique element in the intersection of all Am+1l (Z), i.e.
∩l∈MAm+1l (Z) = P sZ(f) = PZ(f). By Lemma B.2 we get PT (f) = P sT (f) for all T such
that f ∈ ∆T , which completes the proof of the Theorem B.1 and hence also Theorem 5.1.

C Incompatible objective belief formation
An objective belief without any imagination effort for each case reads
PT (D) =
∑
j≤C s(cj)fD(cj)P
cj
fD(cj)·T∑
j≤C s(cj)fD(cj)
Is there a modification of the concatenation axiom (as stated in equation (3)), that is
necessary for an objective representation and which database are admissible?
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Modified Version of the Concatenation axiom in the sense of:
For two databases D ∈ DT1 and E ∈ DT2 , T := T1 + T2 and two numbers L,H ∈ N+
such that fD · L ∈ Nm and fE ·H ∈ Nm, there exists a λ ∈ (0, 1) such that
PT (D ◦ E) = λPL(DL/T1) + (1− λ)PH(EH/T2).
W.l.o.g. we will restrict the analysis to a set of three basic cases, i.e. C = {c1, c2, c3}.
Applying the objective belief to the modified concatenation axiom yields:∑
j≤3 s(cj)fD◦E(cj)P
cj
fD(cj)T1+fE(cj)T2∑
j≤3 s(cj)fD◦E(cj)
= λ
∑
j≤3 s(cj)fD(cj)P
cj
fD(cj)L∑
j≤3 s(cj)fD(cj)
+(1− λ)
∑
j≤3 s(cj)fE(cj)P
cj
fE(cj)H∑
j≤3 s(cj)fE(cj)
We are not allowing to have a law of dynamics for the probabilities P
cj
T (which is also not
reasonable), i.e. like some function Y of P
cj
T = Y (P
cj
L , P
cj
H ). Thus, we directly need to
equalize the precision level for the estimations for each single case, i.e. for all j ≤ m
1{fD(cj)>0}fD(cj)L = 1{fE(cj)>0}fE(cj)H and fD(cj)L ∈ {0, fD(cj)T1 + fE(cj)T2} (16)
Let i, j, l ∈ {1, 2, 3, } be mutually distinct.
In Situation 1 let there exist some i ≤ m such that fD(ci) = 0. Consequently, we
have fD◦E(ci)T =
fE(ci)T2
T T , which must be equal to fE(c1)H and implies H = T2. Only
disjoint D and E can satisfy (16) with H = T2. Thus databases D with fD(c) = 0 for some
c ∈ D allow only concatenations of disjoint databases.
Hence in Situation 2 we consider only databases that share the same support, i.e.
fD(c) > 0 iff fE(c) > 0. For m = i, j equations (16) can be rewritten to
L =
fD(cm)T1 + fE(cm)T2
fD(cm)
= T1 +
fE(cm)T2
fD(cm)
and H = T2 +
fD(cm)T1
fE(cm)
.
The first equation implies that L = T1 +
fE(ci)T2
fD(ci)
= T1 +
fE(cj)T2
fD(cj)
, which results in
fE(ci)
fD(ci)
=
fE(cj)
fD(cj)
, which is only feasible if fE(c)fD(c) = 1 for all c ∈ D. Hence fD = fE represent
different replications of the same database and the above equations yield L = T1+T2 = H.
Thus, the only non-disjoint concatenating database a modified concatenation axiom al-
lows for are replicated identical databases, which is naturally true for all λ ∈ (0, 1), i.e.
PT1+T2(A) = λPT1+T2(A) + (1− λ)PT1+T2(A).
In sum, a objective belief satisfies a modified concatenation axiom only for combinations
of disjoint databases or replicated identical databases. However, as seen in the proof a
restriction to disjoint combining databases offers not sufficient structure to combine all
frequency vectors in the simplex, i.e. the axiom allows only for combination of some lower
dimensional hyper-planes, and hence will not allow to derive the desired objective belief.
D Relationship to EG’s Axiom ”Concatenation restricted
to databases of equal length”
As mentioned at the end of Section 4.2.2, for a general concatenation axiom, the immense
compromising considerations between different cautious estimations can only be avoided by
assuming a common arbitrary level of precision according to which all cases are estimated,
independent of the objective precision of the information. For each piece of information,
literally agents need to imagine (or forget) sufficiently many observation of cases to reach
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an assumed artificial common level of precision. This ensures that no considerations and
compromising regarding different precisions is required and allows an easy averaging based
only on relative relevances of the concatenating databases. However, thereby an agent
also needs to know a priori that she evaluates all information in an imagined precision
and the beliefs contains only (imagined) equally precise and cautious estimations. Conse-
quently, this means that a version of a concatenation axiom that cares for precision and also
applies to arbitrary non-disjoint concatenations accomplishes the averaging of differently
precise information by explicitly assuming away the differences in the sense of employing
consciously estimations induced by imagined (forgotten) equally precise information.
Nevertheless, this discussion delivers an explanation and intuition for the (unexplained)
statement in EG: ” ... we modify the concatenation axiom of BGSS by restricting it to
databases of equal length, i.e. thus controlling for the ambiguity resulting from insufficient
amount of data ”. Their restriction to equal lengths is ad hoc. However, technically
one could argue for the equal length assumption by referring to the discussion above.
An aggregation of differently precise information is only feasible if estimations are based
on a common precision level, which is a consequence of the restrictions in their axiom.
More detailed, their axiom demands, that for a set of n databases of the same length
T, that can be concatenated to a n-times replication of a database, a belief induced by
this database (not the n-th replication) is a average of the beliefs induced by each of
the n databases separately. Obviously, this implies for a appropriate set of concatenating
databases (consisting only of a single case) 24 that the belief induced by the database
- which underlie the n-th replication- is formed by an average of the beliefs induced by
T-times observed cases, i.e. for some appropriate (λc)c∈D ∈ (0, 1)
P (D) =
∑
c∈D
λcP (c
T )
Thus, the restriction to equal lengths implies directly that all contained estimation are
based on this common level as well. In this way EG is indirectly exploiting the above
mechanism to overcome the immense compromising considerations.
However as already discussed, from our perspective and motivation, equal lengths of
database are not sufficient to control for precision of its contained information. Moreover,
in the spirit of the above discussion, EG’s restriction to equal lengths cannot be meaningful
interpreted as controlling for imprecision, but more as an (implicit) proposal to employ
the length of the entire databases as the common (imagined) precision level according to
which all estimations are made.
E Minimal Anchored Axiomatization
Instead of focussing on the most precise case in a database to determine the precision
of its induced belief, we can also take the least precise case as the key determinant for
the precision of a belief. This modification results in a minimal version of an anchored
Concatenation and Constant Similarity Axiom and a corresponding extremely cautious
belief formation.
Definition E.1
Let F ∈ CT be an anchored chain of (Dji (k, Tj))j 6=i≤m.
A length M ∈ N is called the adjusted (minimal) length and denoted by M(k, (Tj)j 6=i≤m)
if it is such that the number of observations of the least frequent case in an anchored chain
F ∈ CT is identical to the number of observations of the least frequent case in the anchored
databases Dji (k, L) (for all j 6= i), (i.e. minc∈C fF (c)T = minc∈C fDji (k,M)(c)M)
24This is always possible, for example consider D = (c21, c2, c
3
3) ∈ C6, then D6 = (c61) ◦ (c61) ◦ (c62) ◦ (c63) ◦ (c63) ◦ (c63),
which implies P (D) = λ1P (c
6
1) + λ2P (c
6
2) + (1− λ1 − λ2)P (c63)
45
Minimal Anchored Concatenation Axiom:
(i) Let F ∈ CT be an anchored chain of (Dji (k, Tj))j 6=i≤m, i.e. F = ◦mj 6=iDji (k, Tj) and
let M ∈ N be the corresponding adjusted (minimal) length, i.e. M = M(k, (T ji )j 6=i), then
there exists λ ∈ ∆m (where λj = 0 for all j ≤ m s. th. Tj = 0), s. th.
PT (F ) =
∑
j 6=i≤m
λjPM (D
j
i (k))
(ii) Let for three distinct i, j, l ≤ m and any V,W ∈ N F = Dji (1, V ) ◦Dlj(1/2, 2W ) then
there exist λ ∈ int(∆2):
PV+2W (F ) = λPmin{V,W}(D
j
i (1)) + (1− λ)Pmin{2V,2W}(Dlj(1/2))
For an analogously adjusted Constant Similarity Axiom the resulting theorem reads:
Theorem E.1
Let there be given a function P : C∗ → ∆(R). Let PT be the restriction of P to CT for
T ∈ N+. Let P satisfies the Learning Axiom and the Diversity Axiom.
Then the following are equivalent:
(i) The function P satisfies the Invariance axiom, the minimal anchored Concatenation
axiom, the ( minimal) Constant Similarity axiom
(ii) There exists for each (T, c) ∈ N× C a unique P cT ∈ ∆(R), and a unique -up to multi-
plication by a positive number- function s : C → R+, s. th. for all T and any D ∈ CT :
PT (D) =
∑
c∈D s(c)fD(c)P
c
TD∗∑
c∈D s(c)fD(c)
(17)
where T ∗D ∈ N+ is defined by TD∗ := T ·minc∈D fD(c).
Interpretational, this means that all estimations are based on the least precise infor-
mation contained in the database and no information needs to be imagined. However,
the focus on the least precise information results in neglecting and discarding many more
precise pieces of information, by processing only until the level of least precision.
A detailed interpretation in terms of perception of precision and an adoption of an
implied attitude of extreme cautiousness can be found in the discussion after Theorem 5.1.
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